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The Cyprus Conflict, as it is known to world politics, 
has ;attracted the attention of scholars concerned with the 
question of the survival and role of small states and nations 
in the Mediterranean. The events in Cyprus can be summed up 
in one phrase : ethnic conflict in a small Mediterranean 
country with a legacy of colonial rule. The two ethnic com- 
munities of Cyprus, Greek and Turkish, have been involved in 
an ongoing conflict which, after a chain of dramatic events, 
which will be retold in this thesis, became the unresolved 
’’Cyprus Question”. 
It seems that after the final confrontation of 1974, it 
has been impossible to reconcile the differences of the two 
Cypriot peoples. In July of the same year, the Greek military 
junta interfered in the affairs of Cynrus by staging a coup 
d’etat against the island’s legal government. This was fol- 
lowed by a Turkish invasion and occupation of 40% of its soil, 
thus imposing a ’’solution” on the Cyprus Question. The costs 
in human terms have been enormous, since thousands of lives 
were lost, 1,700 people are still missing and are almost cer- 
tainly dead, and 200,000 Greek Cypriots and 9,000 Turkish 
Cypriots were driven from their homes to become refugees. 
Apart from these tragic circumstances, the repercussions 
of the actions that took place in 1974 were numerous and were 
felt at all levels of international politics. Apart from the 
tragic loss of human life, the destruction of Cyprus as an in- 
dependent, sovereign and unified state, was the most sen ous 
s 
loss of all. The Cyprus Conflict brought two NATO members, 
Greece and Turkey, to the brink of war, has aggravated their 
existing differences over the potentially much more serious 
question of territorial rights in the Aegean, and has directly 
resulted in serious problems between Washington, Ankara and 
Athens over U.S. military bases in both countries. The stabi- 
lity of the Mediterranean has been hurt once more. The Eastern 
Mediterranean, with the on-going Lebanse civil-war, the whole 
Middle-Eastern Question and the added Cyprus Conflict stands 
like a time-bomb to international peace. This explosive situa- 
tion was exacerbated in 1987, with the tension that was created 
in diplomatic relations between the two neighbouring countries 
-Greece and Turkey- over oil rights in the Aegean. War, how- 
ever, was averted. 
The original independence settlement of 1960, which 
resulted in the planning of the Constitution of the new State 
of Cyprus, was an affair determined in great measure by Great 
Britain, Greece and Turkey, without much reference to the 
people of Cyprus as such, or to their community leaders. Con- 
crete historical facts have led researchers to conclude that 
there was never real independence in Cyprus. The effect that 
the original constitutional settlement had on the Cypriot 
people perpetuating a community divided between 80i Greeks and 
181 Turks (with 2% Maronites and Armenians making up a total 
population of 650,000), was in essence no different from the 
effect that the partition had on the island : total separation 
of the two peoples thus became forcibly permanent. 
J.ack of serious analysis of the topic has produced 
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misconceptions and over-simplified ’Versions” of the Cyprus 
problem, so that the whole conflict is made out to be an ir- 
reconcilable quarrel between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which 
erupted into open violence in the last thirty years or so. 
It will be argued in this thesis, however, that the distortion 
of ethnic relations between the two ethnic communities, which 
resulted in total separation, was not a product of the historic- 
al progression of hatred that the two ethnic groups developed 
for one another within Cyprus. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to show that foreign 
strategic interests dictated by power politics in the Middle 
East, have been the most decisive factors in the development of 
ethnic conflict between the Greek and the Turkish communities 
of the island. A few necessary steps have to be taken in order 
to indicate the process of total separation that the tw^o ethnic 
groups experienced. It will be necessary to show how internal 
realities and domestic processes, like nationalist aspirations 
of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island, were 
manipulated by international power politics, and directed from 
outside by those great powers. 
This thesis argues firstly, that Great Britain as the 
former colonial power, follow^ed a divide-and-rule policy, 
through its administrative practices and turned always-existing 
apolitical religious differences between Muslims and Eastern 
Orthodox Christian Cypriots into antagonistic nationalisms, 
initiating and thus consolidating ethnic differentiations. 
Once Great Britain evaluated the strategic importance of Cyprus, 
for its military operations in the rest of its Empire, and for 
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those of the new-born Western Alliance, Britain then played one 
ethnic group off against the other, in order to weaken Greek 
majority demands for self-determination. 
With the break-up of the British colonial system, and 
w^ith changing realities in international power politics. Great 
Britain agreed to allow independence of the island on the condi- 
tion that its military bases were maintained on Cyprus and so 
preserve its rights as an'interested party through binding 
treaties. Additionally, nationalist influences from Greece 
and Turkey were introduced in order to interfere with domestic 
social and political processes in the island. Reciprocally, 
the emotional attachments of each ethnic community to its 
motherland were manipulated, rendering the developments in 
Cyprus, so that it was easily dominated from outside. 
In 1960, Britain designed a Constitution that institu- 
tionalized foreign intervention in the political affairs of 
Cyprus, and favoured the Turkish minority -as a protegee of 
Turkey, the most important Western ally at the time- against 
the ’’rebellious" Greek majority. This deeply disturbed the two 
communities, thus distorting ethnic relations. 
Secondly it will be shown that the crises of 1963 and 
1968 were a result of the deficiencies of the British imposed 
1960 Constitution, its unworkable provisions, and the unequal 
balance of power divided between the tw^o communities. Institu- 
tionalized intervention resulted in conflict between them and 
between their respective mother countries. American involvement 
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in Cypriot politics, directly or covertly asserted through 
successive Greek and Turkish governments, provided the comple- 
tion of a closely woven linkage which further promoted separa- 
tion . 
Lastly, this thesis will link the partition of the island 
to the external interests and interventions involved prior to 
the implementation of the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus and then 
secured in that Constitution, and persisting after independence, 
to show that partition was not simply the outcome of armed 
conflict between two alienated and frustrated ethnic communi- 
ties. It was a directed plan, as well as a desired result 
firstly on the part of U.S. diplomacy. Great Britain (particular- 
ly throughout the mid-fifties and lasting well into the early 
seventies), and lastly the NATO powers to incorporate Gyprus 
into the Western sphere of influence, and to please Turkey, one 
of its most important Western allies in the Mediterranean (a 
relationship which has lasted for over thirty years). 
Sociologically, the Cyprus conflict may be well viewed 
as a majority/minority issue, where race, language and religion 
have been the dividing factors ever since the two ethnic groups 
of Cyprus have come into contact with one another. However, 
our purpose is to show that a historical perpetuation of these 
differences based along these lines was never true for Cyprus, 
and that its two communities have lived peacefully side-by- 
side , in the past. 
This thesis does not underestimate the internal dynamics 
9 
of ethnic differences per se, such as social and cultural chanp,es 
and the development of nationalism, as factors givinp rise to 
ethnic consciousness and conflict. However, it does maintain 
that ethnic conflict was exacerbated by external encouragement 
of extremism by both sides, and that, in short, external in- 
volvements have been most decisive in explaining the constraints 
that w'ere created and the un"willingness of the two communities 
to live and function side-by-side. Therefore, this perspective 
suggests that the inter-communal conflict in Cyprus cannot be 
viewed solely within the borders of the Republic, as the two 
major ethnic groups of the island had little, or, no control 
over their OWTI destinv. 
In theoretical Sociology the area of dependency consti- 
tutes a w^ide topic of research, and has presented several con- 
temporary models dealing with this issue, which are directly 
applicable to Cyprus. 
Harry Magdoff, in his works Age of Imperialism C1966) and 
From the Colonial Age to the Present (1978), analyses the 
features of m.odern Imperialism, stressing that dependency can 
take many forms -economic,political or military- in our post- 
colonial era. He makes a distinction between Colonial Im- 
perialism and Imperialism without colonies. In the former, he 
stresses that the dominant power had in the past disrupted the 
traditional ruling groups of the colonies and destroyed their 
political power. The dissolution of the colonies was carried 
out in such a way as to preserve for the mother country as many 
of its advantages as nossible. The ’’core” had created and 
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sponsored elites which were psychologically and economically 
dependent on foreign rulers (Magdoff, 1978, p.140,145). 
Also, Magdoff analyses historically the new realities 
that were shaped after the Russian Revolution and the Second 
VJorld War, and shows how "reconquering lost territories", be- 
comes an essential feature of the market economy to counteract 
the expansion of the socialist world. (Magdoff, 1966, p.40). 
Central to his thesis of "Imperialism Without Colonies" 
is the new role of the United States, which becomes the leader 
and organizer of the world system, interfering in the politics 
and class-conflicts of ex-colonies. The United States aims at 
becoming the main provider of military assistance, of the 
dominant partner of an alliance, and economic aid, strengthen- 
ing those sections of the ruling class which are sympathetic 
and reliable, and constructing a global network of military 
bases and staging areas (Magdoff, 1978, p.110, 144), Thus, a 
country can be officially, politically independent, but, in fact 
enmeshed in diplomatic dependence on the United States. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, in Glimpses of World History (1949) 
draws some parallels between direct (colonial) Imperialism and 
indirect Imperialism, "without colonies". He names them res- 
pectively "visible" and "invisible" Imperialism, and explains 
how formerly dependent ex-colonies can be equally dominated by 
this new invisible Imperialism (Nehru, 1949, p.g. 478,479). 
Whereas Britain controlled India and other parts of the world, 
by governing the population directly, and responsibly, the U.S. 
gains economic, political and military control without 
shouldering any responsibi 1 ity for gOA^erning the country, by 
exercising indirect domination, that is by supporting and 
maintaining dictaroships by choice (Nehru, 1949, p.570). 
Finally, the theoretical political geographer Yves 
Lacoste, concentrates on a special category of dependent 
countries, which owe that dependency to their key geo-political 
and strategic position. As with Magdoff, Lacoste’s paradigm 
applies to Cyprus as well (Lacoste, 1985). 
The theoretical frameworks of the aforementioned writers 
provide a basis and a point of departure for this thesis' dis- 
cussion of the ethnic conflict in Cyprus by tracing its hi- 
storical development at the domestic as well as at the interna- 
tional power politics level. 
I will establish in this thesis, that Cyprus falls into 
the category of the new-geopolitically dependent colony. As a 
former colony, its internal realities were exploited by the 
British colonial rulers, and ethnic separation had been promoted 
in order to advance British, and the American colonial interests 
With the break up of the British Imperialist system, covert 
Imperialism was exercised by United States diplomacy, NATO and 
their clients at the time of independence. Constant interfer- 
ance in the domestic politics of Cyprus, thus, provided the 
ground for the ethnic divisiveness and escalation of the con- 
flict, that reached its peak with the 1974 partition of the 
island. 
A number of scholars have discussed the international 
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linkages entwined in the Cyprus Question and have treated it 
as a power-politics issue. However, although it has been 
suggested before that foreign involvements have contributed to 
ethnic conflict in Cyprus, the kind of dependency has been 
inappropriately emphasized, as this thesis sets out to demon- 
strate . 
Parallel to that, the notion that the geo-political posi- 
tion of a country can 'play a critical role in the course of 
history, especially in the Mediterranean, gains new importance. 
It adds a new dimension to the area of dependency and ethnic 
relations and so opens up a new area of research worthy of 
scholarly attention. 
This thesis suggests that the "Cyprus Question", although 
it appears to be a complex and unique issue, might prove useful 
as a future field for scholarly endeavour, especially of geo- 
political dependency. It would be interesting to examine for 
example multi-cultural societies and the potential of this 
particular dependency as a decisive factor for distorting ethnic 
relations. 
Naturally enough, this thesis employs the analysis of 
documents, mainly secondary sources, as well as some-primary 
sources, for unfortunately a lot of primary sources are still 
kept confidential in the government files of Greece, Turkey, 
Britain and the U.S. as well as in the files of the government 
of Cyprus. However, adequate prim.ary sources were available 
to me through the appropriate archives of the Greek Government 
and the Government of Cyprus. 
Government Publications, and the international 
been used to provide additional information, as well 









A brief historical account of Cyprus is necessary in order 
to explain the factors which led to the island’s unresolved con- 
flict, and the context in which ancient differences -sometimes 
rivalries- have been exploited for modern politico-economic 
interests. The geo-political importance of Cyprus throughout 
history is also emphasized. In addition, this chapter intends 
to stress the long tradition of co-existence and the point where 
ethnic differentiation began, late in this century. 
I. Ottoman Rule 
The island of Cyprus has been Greek from the Bronze Age. 
During the second m.illenium before Christ, the island w^as 
settled by Achean Greeks. The records of antiquity confirm the 
Hellenic character of the island. The Cypriot mythology is 
indissoluble from the Greek. Its tempting and vulnerable posi- 
tion, saw Cyprus become part of Assyria, Persia, the Empire of 
Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire, and finally, a province 
of the Byzantine Empire. Later, it fell under the hegemony of 
Richard the Lionheart; was handed over to the Franks, until it 
was occupied by the Turkish Ottoman Empire, which ruled it for 
300 years. The character of the island rem.ained unmistakably 
Creek, until the British took over in 1878, as Ronald Storrs, 
an early Governor of the island, testifies (Storrs, 1945). 
The Christian population of Cyprus, which had been oppressed 
under Frankish rule, was rather relieved once the Turks became 
and the privileges of the 
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the new rulers, the ancient dignity 
Orthodox Church, were restored (Kill, 1952). 
The administrative system of the new order became corrupt, 
however. Initially though, the intentions of the Turkish 
Government, with respect to the treatment of the island were 
praiseworthy since the Turkish Government declared that the 
Greeks would be treated with justice and moderation (Hill, 1952). 
Traditional co-existence and shared social and cultural 
identity characterized the period of Ottoman rule in Cyprus. 
In accordance with the Islamic conception of the Ottoman Empire 
Christians were to be protected, although they were not to enjoy 
the privileges accorded to the true believers. There were a 
large number of conversions to Islam during those years prompted 
by an act of economic necessity to avoid the capitation tax, 
which fell heavily on the shoulders of the Christian Greeks. 
This explains the fact that Greek and Turkish settlements were 
interspersed all over the island, and that there were no 
separate ethnic communities. 
Testimony of shared culture is the form of religious syn- 
cretism, recorded in the past. The Cryptochristians of Cyprus 
-used to be called ’’Linobambakoi”- practiced the rites of Islam 
publicly, and Christianity secretly. Each person used to have 
a Christian, as well as a Moslem name (Dawkins, 1933). Such 
phenomena persisted until our time, well after the development 
of Greek and Turkish nationalism on the island in the form of 
agricultural co-operation and social intercourse and seen most 
prominently, in the context of the integrated village unit of 
(Attalides, 1977). 
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rural Cyprus (Kitromilides, 1977) 
In Cypriot agrarian society, Greek and Turkish peasants 
were under two systems of social control, or, two ’’Millets”. 
In each Millet, control lay in the hands of the pasha and the 
aghas, and the Orthodox hierarchy respectively (Hill, 1952). 
Conflicts during the Ottoman period in Cyprus did exist, but 
seemed to have been along class lines. The social structure 
was such that all classes were composed of both Muslims and 
Christians. In fact, due to the increasing corruption and in- 
creasing exploitation of the peasantry, peasant revolts erupted 
against the oppression from above, in which Turks, as well as 
Greeks, took part (Alastos, 1955) (Hill, 1952). In addition, 
power struggles within the local Turkish power structure, or 
between the powerful groups heading the two ’’Millets”, have 
been recorded (Kitromilides, 1977). Furthermore, common action 
at the grassroot level stimulated a number of actions as 
strategies for survival. 
On one occasion, due to the rebellion of the mainland 
Greeks against Ottoman rule, the Governor of Cyprus convinced 
the Sultan to execute the most wealthy and influential among 
the Greeks of Cyprus, because of fears over a possible uprising 
on the island. Despite the fact that a large-scale massacre 
took place, we have recorded attempts of Turks, to rescue their 
Greek fellow^-countrymen (Hill, 1 952). 
Until the end of the 19th century, European travellers 
and observers had never commented on cultural distinctions or 
differences of ’’national character” between Muslims and Chri- 
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stians in Cyprus (Alastos, 1955). In fact, the concept of 
nationality was meaningless to the Cypriot during the period 
of Ottoman rule. F,ven in the 20th century when the Orthodox 
Christians increasingly began to view themselves as Greeks, 
the Muslims continued to view themselves as a religious, not as 
a national group. Furthermore, it is important to stress that 
before 1955 there was no history of inter-communal conflict 
in Cyprus. The island had been described as ah ’’ethnographical 
fruit-cake” in which the Greek and Turkish currants were mixed 
up in every town and village and almost in every street (Hitchens, 
1984). Although political clashes over the future of Cyprus 
had actually been taking place, the Cypriots never experienced 
the religious and national struggle of Crete and other Greek, 
islands occupied by the Turkish Imperial armies. Even during 
the First World War with Britain and Greece on one side, and 
Turkey on the other, there was no hostility betw^een the Greek 
and the Turkish Cypriots. It was only when the Turks put on 
British uniforms to oppose a popular movement that they were 
shot at by the Greeks of Cyprus. 
When the Ottoman rule ended in 1878, the Turkish presence 
in the island formed 18°e of the population. At the same time, 
the Greek presence, stretching back for over 3,000 years, formed 
80-O of the population, 
11 . Divide and Rule : Thei Process of Ethnic Differentiation 
In 1878 the island was ceded to Great Britain as a securi- 
ty for helping the Turks maintain and defend Turkish domination 
in Asia against Russia. 
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taking Cyprus, was 
Great Britain took 
the island back to 
abated. From 1878 
Turkey, but when in 
Powers, Cyprus was 
However, the primary object of Britain 
its strategic importance (Hill 1952). 
over Cyprus agreeing that she would hand 
Turkey as soon as the Russian threat had 
until 1914, Great Britain ruled on trust for 
1914 Turkey joined forces with the Central 
annexed outright by the British Empire. 
Cyprus was held as a colony not so much 
but so as to guarantee other British colonial 
Egypt, Palestine and India. It was, however, 
true Crown colony. 
for its own sake, 
dispensations in 
governed as a 
The British rulers en£o 
The adoption of policies desi 
the colonial power inevitably 
social system. Implem.enting 
standing of the social realit 
transformation of the social 
British rule presented a seri 
existing differences between 
process, shared culture and v 
reed a policy of indirect rule, 
gned to further the interests of 
had an impact on the existing 
such policies assumed an under- 
ies on the island. The gradual 
system during the early years of 
es of changes which redefined minor 
the two ethnic groups. During this 
alues were ignored. 
It is important at this point to mention a series of 
changes that were brought about by the British. The freedoms 
that were granted to the individual, as well as the promotion 
of European Culture, and the existence of a British community, 
strongly influenced the two ethnic groups of Cyprus. 
The cities became clean and ’’tidy”, with beautiful govern- 
ment houses and schools, as well as private residences. 
Electricity was installed throughout the cities, and roads were 
constructed. The peasants were educated in ways that promoted 
cultivation and forestry. Cattle-raising was also promoted. 
C Zannetos, 1 930). 
Among the most notable changes w^as the promotion of com- 
merce. A new middle class of professionals and merchant traders 
was formed and became a powerful economic element in the country. 
There was a surplus of scientists (Ibid, 1930). 
The Church also showed significant progress. The higher 
clerics were University graduates, with the opportunity of 
undertaking post graduate studies in Europe. 
In the meantime, the rise of Greek nationalism started 
to be felt in the island early in the 19th century, with Cyprus’ 
response to the Greek War of Independence. The first formal 
expression of the desire for Union, ’’enosis" with Greece, 
occurred. However, for many years it did not disturb the tra- 
ditional co-existence between the Greek and the Turkish 
Cypriots. By contrast, there were no signs of the development 
of a Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. 
Economic change and social mobilization during the first 
decades of British rule, w^ere the preconditions for the in- 
tensification of nationalist demands. The penetration of 
nationalism from the cities to the rural areas through the 
channels of school, church, political and economic patronage, 
provided the mass basis for the development of the ’’enosis” 
movement, into a pov^erful political force in Cyprus (Attalides, 
1976). When the rural communities were effectively socialized 
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by Greek nationalism it was a turning point for a mass movement 
to be created. In addition, new social groups w^ere drawn into 
politics, and identified with Greek nationalism. 
During the period of Ottoman rule, there was no admini- 
strative separation of Greek Cypriot from the Turkish Cypriot 
schools. From the first years of British rule, though a formal 
educational system was established, but it was divided rather 
than unified. Two Boards of Education were created, one Greek, 
the other Ottoman, and control was vested in Athens and Constan- 
tinople respectively. 
The curricula used from 1878 until 1933, in both the 
Greek and the Turkish Cypriot schools had not kept pace with' 
developments in the mother countries of the two ethnic communi- 
ties. This was especially so in the Greek schools, since the 
Archbishop continued to head the Greek Board of Education. The 
schools were considered nurseries of the national ideals, and 
the aims of the Greek state (Spyridakis, 1959) (Anastassiades, 
1979). This dual secular school system ensured the development 
of the political cultures. 
This segregation was further reinforced by the political 
institutions which the British established. In 1882, the 
British colonial administration established a Legislative 
Council, w^here members of the two communities participated. 
The British administration, in fact, depended on the vote of 
the Turkish minority to offset the elected votes of the Greek 
Cypriots. In time, these actions led to the promotion of 
separate antagonistic nationalities, the Greek and the Turkish. 
21 
Since, the British perceived two ethnic groups in the Cyprus, 
the Legislative Council was similarily constituted with British 
members being the ’’balancers" between the presumed antagonistic 
ethnic representatives. 
As the educational values and curricula of the mainlands 
were transplanted to Cyprus, the two ethnic communities were 
faced w^ith the historical confrontation of the two nations, 
that fought their w^ars. of independence against one another 
(Kitromilides, 1977). In time, the Cypriots came to view them- 
selves just as the British did, separate antagonistic nationa- 
lities, Greek and Turk fighting for political power and control 
over the same territory. 
Thus, the British took apolitical religious differences 
in Cyprus between Muslims and Eastern Orthodox Christians, and 
through indirect rule politicized them and transformed them 
into nationalist groups. Thus, the development of a unitary 
Cypriot nationality was hindered (Pollis, 1979). 
Once separate nattonalities were formed, and each ethnic 
group -through British policies- was made to identify with its 
respective mother country, two reciprocal things happened. 
Firstly, Greece as a country whose method of nation-building 
had been a long process of "union" of some of its former 
territories, asked the British that Cyprus be united with her. 
This was refused by the British. In turn, the Greek Cypriot 
community which had suffered from unjust economic measures 
imposed on it, demanded "enosis” with mother Greece. These 
demands were strongly rejected and boycotted by the British 
rulers (Stephens, 1966), (Kyriakides, 1968), (Pollis, 1979). 
In 1931, the Greek Cypriots protested against an imposed 
tax increase. The economic crisis was in fact part of the 
economic depression which dominated all Europe in the 1920’s. 
An uprising took place and the Legislative Council was abolished. 
The Greek community suffered severe educational restrictions, 
the British aiming at the elimination of the "Greekness", 
which was cultivated in the Greek schools, a system which the 
British themselves had created. The teaching of history and 
geography was forbidden, and the flying of the Greek flag was 
prohibited, up until World War I (Kyriakides, 1968). 
Shortly after World War I, and in order to counteract 
the majority’s demands for Union with Greece, the British 
continued to side with the loyal Turkish minority, thus forming 
a permanent opposition to the Greek Cypriots. 
The use of a minority population in the proping up of 
colonial rule was not a rare phenomenon. The immediate benefits 
of this policy of playing one group off against another was to 
keep ultimate control for oneself, and it was a classic 
technique of colonial administrations. In the long run, once 
each ethnic community would be conscious of ethnic differentia- 
tion, independence would trigger contests over prospective 
spoils (Attalides, 1977), (Kitromilides, 1977). 
The culmination of the process of ethnic differentiation 
in the consolidation of structurally and culturally distinct, 
and often antagonistic communities, deeply conscious of their 
for ethnic conflict. Ethnic 
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attachments, sets-the preconditions 
violence is probable once suspicion and antagonism have been 
created. 
As for the Turkish Cypriots, although their leaders had 
opposed Greek "enosis”, their main demand was the continuation 
of British rule. These protests were often phrased in religious 
rather than national terms. 
III. British Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean 
In the first decade of the 20th century, Cyprus had 
attracted some slight British attention as a possible strategic 
post on a projected overland route to the Persian Gulf and 
India, via the Euphrates Valley. In fact, for Prime Ministers 
from Disraeli to Harold Wilson, Britain’s policy in Cyprus has 
been a reflection of her general policy in the Near and Middle 
East and of the role of Turkey in the area (Stephens, 1966). 
After World War II, British interest in Cyprus became of great 
importance because of the British withdrawal from Palestine in 
1948 and following the disastrous intervention in Egypt over the 
Suez Canal in 1954, Cyprus became the new British Middle East 
Headquarters. 
At the U.N. Assembly in 1954, Cyprus raised the issue of 
the form that self-determination w^ould take. This marked the 
beginning of the internationalization of the Cyprus problem. 
In these debates, it was revealed that the problem of Cyprus 
w^as closely interwoven with the interests of Britain, which 
were to fulfil her treaty obligations to the Arab states, NATO, 
Greece, Turkey and the U.N. (General Assembly, 9th Session, 
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First Committee, 750th Meeting, 1954). 
To the British, sovereignty over Cyprus was not only 
necessary but paramount. Any discussion concerning Cyprus 
would have to be considered within the broader context of 
Eastern Mediterranean politics especially within British-Greek- 
Turkish relations. 
Turkey too, was becoming of increasing importance in 
British as well as American plans for the Middle East. The 
U.S.Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles wanted an American- 
backed alliance between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan to close the 
gap, in the ring of containment around Russia. Apart from 
preventing Russian penetration, Tuekry was also helping pre- 
serve British oil interests in the Middle East. 
Anthony Eden seized the opportunity to combine the 
American and the British concepts by encouraging the creation 
of the Baghdad Pact, signed in 1955. Turkey played a leading 
role in this Pact. Turkey assumed a tremendous political and 
military significance in the eyes of the British government. 
The British policy began to show signs of going back to the 
original idea which had inspired the Cyprus Convention, protec- 
tion of, and support for, Turkey as the shield for British 
interests in the Middle East, that is, in the Persian Gulf. 
Eden was to write later in respect of Cyprus "I regarded our 
Alliance with Turkey as the first consideration in our policy 
in that part of the world" (Eden, 1960, p.414). Elsewhere of 
Cyprus : "First came the strategic value of the island. Our 
military adr^isers regarded it as an essendial staging post for 
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the maintenance of our position in the Middle East, including 
the Persian Gulf” (Parliamentary Debates-Commons, 1955-1956, 
VOL.550, p.403-419). 
As Stephens notes ”Yet if imperialism consists of one 
people's ruling against the latter's will for the sake of the 
former's strategic or economic interests, then there never was 
a more clear cut case of it than Cynrus (Stephens, 1966, p.139) 
Anthony Eden had announced in the House of Commons : "...Our 
duty if called on... is to safeguard the strategic needs of 
our country and of our ally (Turkey). Neither the NATO obliga- 
tions...nor the Bagdhad Pact, nor any agreement in the Middle 
Eastern area of the Persian Gulf, or anything else, none of 
these can be speadily and effectively carried out today unless 
we have the assured and unfettered use of bases and the use 
of facilities in Cyprus”. (Parliamentary Debates-Commons, 
1955-1956, VOL.550, p.403-419). 
The Anglo-Turkish partnership that had been formed, 
encouraged and welcomed Turkish involvement in the Cyprus dis:- 
pute. Turkey's interest in Cyprus had not been expressed yet, 
since Britain maintained power over the island. In 1951 the 
Turkish Foreign■Minister had observed that if there was to be 
a change in the status of Cyprus, Turkey should participate in 
order to safeguard its interests (World Opinion on Cyprus,1958) 
(Attalides, 1979). These interests were expressed in the 1954 
U.N.debate where opposition to the self-determination of 
Cyprus was declared on the grounds that the status of Cyprus 
was important for the defence of Southern Turkey and of the 
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Northern Mediterranean in general (General Assembly, op.cit. 
1954). Thus Britain stimulated Turkish involvement, in order 
to counteract the majority's demands for self-determination by 
suggesting that Turkey had some grounds for claiming that 
Cyprus should return to her. At a London conference in 1955, 
Britain invited Turkey to attend as the third interested party 
in the dispute. Turkish newpaper AUDINLIK, testifies to the 
fact that with the formation of the Anglo-Turkish partnership 
the British aimed at inciting trouble between the Greeks and 
the Turks, in order to justify their position on the island 
(AUDINLIK, 28-30/3/79). 
In the late 1950's, British setbacks in the Middle East, 
namely the Suez expedition, the Lebanese Civil V/ar and the 
weakening of the Bagdhad Pact, increased Britain’s dependence 
on Turkey and increased Cyprus’ importance as an advance 
British base in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the membership 
of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey in NATO made the Cyprus 
dispute more complex. It brought other NATO allies into the 
dispute and eventually it became a Cold War issue. The British 
Government indicated that the Cyprus dispute not merely re- 
flected the rival claims of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot com- 
munities, but it essentially reflected the national interests 
of Greece and Turkey and the strategic interests of Britain 
and NATO as well (Parliamentary Debates-Commons 1955-1956). 
There is substantial evidence to suggest that the in- 
creasing importance of Turkey as a strategic factor to the 
United States and Great Britain, resulted in the corresponding 
weakening of Greece's position within the NATO Alliance. As 
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Kuniholm stresses, "...if one had to rank the strategic impor- 
tance of Turkey and Greece, geography and sheer numbers vouid 
give Turkey priority. This was true in the early 50's and it 
is even more true today" (Kuniholm, Orbis, ’83). 
IV. The Anti-Colonial Struggle 
In 1954, the British Minister of State for the Colonies, 
Hopkinson, announced in the House of Commons with respect to 
Cyprus : "There are certain territories in the Commonwealth 
which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never 
expect to be fully independent" (Parliamentary Debates-Commons 
1955-1956). 
This statement triggered opposition by the Greek Cypriot 
side. Once the British divide-and-rule policy provided the 
basis for the development of dual nationalisms and once their 
divisive policies and the cultivation of ethnic differentiation 
had succeded in creating revalry between the two ethnic groups 
of Cyprus, the Cypriots became fertile ground for Greek and 
Turkish propaganda. By 1955, the rise of EOKA, a terrorist 
organization which attacked the British for the purpose of 
achieving union with Greece, further polarized the two communi- 
ties. The movement as such did not antagonize the Turkish 
Cypriots. However, the British began to employ Turkish 
Cypriots in the island’s police and auxiliary forces, thus 
making them a target for terrorists, and dependent on the 
British for protection. The British, trained an exclusively 
Turkish mobile reserve to combat EOKA. It was at that time 
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that the Turkish Cypriot community acquired a Turkish identity, 
coupled by the fact that during the same period Britain 
brought Turkey into the negotiations for the independence of 
Cyprus as an interested party. The first true inter-ethnic 
conflict between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus took place in 
1957, when Volkan, a Turkish terrotist group was organized to 
combat EOKA. It is noteworthy that in 1955, Dr. Kuchuk was 
allowed to organize, with the declared help of a Turkish na- 
tional, a political party with the name ''Cyprus is Turkish 
Party”. This was at a time when all Greek political parties 
were banned, and Britain claimed exclusive sovereignty over 
the island (Pollis, 1979), (Hitchens, 1984). 
With British encouragement and systematic direction from 
mainland Turkey throughout the period, Volkan managed to bring 
the entire Turkish Cypriot community into its grip. This 
triumph of extremist policy by the Turkish Cypriots, failed 
to be achived by the extremist elements of EOKA, the Greek 
Cypriot fighters. Moreover, though the Turkish Cypriot terror- 
ist group Volkan was founded in 1955 and carried out many 
lethal attacks on civilians very few members of it were ever 
tried, or punished by the British Crown. In contrast, num.erous 
supporters of the Greek Cypriot EOKA were hanged, and hundreds 
more imprisoned. 
Ethnic antagonism was strengthened further by the support 
of Greece and Turkey for their ethnic communities in Cyprus. 
(Daily Herald : 11-7-1958), (Tribune 13-6-1958), (The Observer, 
13-7-1958). 
The pro-Turkish British policy gave birth to a series of 
constitutional proposals that favoured the Turkish minority of 
Cyprus, thus weakening the position of the Greek Cypriot majori- 
ty. The Turkish newspaper Audinlik confirms this fact, in an 
article published on 31-3-79. 
In 1956, Lord Radcliffe presented a constitution for 
limited self-government, which he had drawn up. These proposals 
favoured the Greek majority, giving them the representation in 
government that was in accordance with their numerical superiori- 
ty in the total' population. At that time, Archbishop Makarios, 
leader of the Greek Cypriot political groups, was exiled by 
the British to the Seychelles, because of the earlier break-up 
of the negotiations, between the rulers and the Greek Cypriots. 
Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, re- 
vealed the proposals to Parliament, adding the assurance that 
if they were adopted and worked well over a period of years, 
the Government would then consider self-determination. To this 
he added that, if the Greek Cypriot demands for self-determina- 
tion continued to be identified with union with Greece, the 
Turks of Cyprus would also have the right of union with Turkey 
(Parliamentary Debates-Commons-1956). Thus, the idea of parti- 
tion, which was to become the official Turkish policy and has 
remained unchanged until now, was officially born and offered 
to the Turks as an alternative solution which would satisfy 
their demands. There is some evidence that the public floating 
of the partition idea was the result of a policy agreed be- 
tween the British and Turkish governments at a meeting in 
Ankara (Foley, 1964). A few months later, it was put forward 
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in the House of Commons. 
Naturally, the Greek Cypriots turned down the plan, over 
fears of partition, and a great opportunity was lost for the 
Greek Cypriots, which in time might have solved the Cyprus 
Question to their advantage. In such an environment of dis- 
trust and suspicion, however, and with the Greek Cypriot 
leader Makarios in exile the responsibility of the failure fell 
heavy on the shoulders of the British Government. 
Throughout the following year, until the beginning of 
the Greco-Turkish talks at the end of 1958, which led to the 
Zurich and London agreements, it was Turkey who dictated the 
course of diplomacy over Cyprus, while the British and the 
Greek Cypriots were fighting each other on the island. T-he 
intention of the Turks was to block any deal between Britain 
and the Greek Cypriots, which would open the door to self-de- 
term.ination (Tribune, 1 6-9-1 955), (The Manchester Guardian, 
23-11-1955), (The Spectator, 13-7-1956). 
In 1957, the new Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, 
arrived in Cyprus and began to prepare the ground for new ne- 
gotiations. The violence between the Greek Cypriots, the 
Turkish Cypriots and the British rulers was at its peak. Foot 
proposed that Cyprus had the right to be given an opportunity 
for self-determination. If« the majority wanted union with 
Greece, Turkey had to agree to it. However, this was rejected 
by the British Cabinet. They cautioned that Turkey was a 
cardinal factor in the defence of the West, and if Turkey was 
offended, it could lapse into neutrality (Foley, 1962). 
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The last constitutional proposal was the MacMillan Plan 
of 1957. This plan provided for a limited self-government. 
The country would be run by a council headed by a British 
Governor with representatives from Greece, Turkey and Cypriots 
of both communities. Defence, internal security and foreign 
affairs would be run by the British. In each town, there would 
be separate municipalities for Greek and Turkish residents. 
The Greek government together with Greek Cypriot leaders 
rejected the plan. They cautioned that the MacMillan Plan was 
imposing a triple condominium and it was aiming at partition. 
With regards to the plan, Harold MacMillan himself, wrote : 
"Could the solution devised by Solomon in a similar predicament 
now be proposed as an acceptable escape of our difficulties? 
Or could its threat perhaps bring the contenders to a sense of 
reality? If partition became a practical answ^er, we need only 
be concerned about the future of the military base and instal- 
lations , so necessary both for the protection of our interests 
in the Middle East and for the support of the right flank of 
NATO". And elsewhere : "Although for my part, I disliked the 
idea of dividing so small an area into two separate nations 
with the usual frontier troubles and with the obvious economic 
disadvantages, I began however, reluctantly, to feel in my own 
mind that perhaps part it ion_wi 11 be_the only w^ay out" (Mac 
Millan, 1971, my emphasis). 
This new plan provided for the delineation of British 
military enclaves where full British sovereignty would be 
retained, while the rest of the island would be ruled by a 
condominium of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey with 
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sovereignty held in partnership (Mac Millan, 1971). 
In the British parliament, the plan vas strongly criti- 
cized by the Labour Party. Some excerpts from the debates in 
the House of Commons reveal the Labour Party's opposition to 
the MacMillan Plan : "What does that imply about the constitu- 
tion? It is that it achieves the object of holding the two 
communities so much apart that they will require the British 
to keep law and order on the island. Therefore, the Tories 
who.-say that they have diagnosed correctly what the ultimate 
effect of the constitution will be and they are supporting the 
constitution, not because they want to see a settlement, but 
because it holds the two communities apart and that will be an 
excuse for us to stay on the island" : Mr. R.H.S. Crossman 
(World Opinion on Cyprus, 1958, p.81). 
And, "....It envisages a total separation of responsibi-1 
lities for administration and government in the two communities. 
In my view, this plan was correctly described by The Tim.es as 
a form of non-territorial partition in itself. I should say 
that it makes self-determination virtually impossible and 
partition of the island, almost inevitable" : Mr. Kenneth 
P.obinson (World Opinion on Cyprus, 1 958 , p. 81-82). 
And again, "The danger of the plan -and I am sure that 
the Colonial Secretary must have seen this in preparing it- is 
that it will encourage both communities in the island to look 
almost exclusively to the representatives from Ankara and 
Athens. There is no unity that way" : Mr. James Callaghan 
(World Opinion on Cyprus, 1958, p.85). 
Finally, ”I hope that the ultimate idea is unity and not 
partition. But we have seen elsewhere how very difficult it 
is to achieve integration after a long period of segregation; 
and you are proposing to enforce this segregation after centu- 
ries of peaceful integration" : Lord Winster(World Opinion on 
Cyprus, 1958, p.87). 
These views proved to be of great importance in the later 
political history of Cyprus, for, as will be indicated in the 
following pages, they became self-fullfilling prophecies. 
In sum, it was felt by the British opposition, that the 
MacMillan Plan aimed at perpetuating British rule by deepening 
the gap between- the Greek and the Turkish Community. In Cyprus, 
the reaction was an increase in violence. 
In the same year, MacMillan revised his plan and announced 
it to the interested parties. The modifications were minor. 
The representatives from Greece and Turkey would now sit in the 
Governor's council with the Cypriots, but they would be there 
to advise them. The revised plan was still unacceptable to 
the Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios, and to Greece : 
A few months later, the Turkish government announced it would 
co-operate with the British in implementing the plan, which was 
reconciliable with partition (Foley, 1964). Lord Radcliffe, 
strongly opposing this decision declared that a division of 
Cyprus would have been impossible since there was no physical 
division between the two communities, which were scatterred 
indistinguishably over the island. There was no room to man- 
oeuvre in Cyprus such as there had been in India and Ireland. 
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(Journal of the Royal Empire Society-Jan.-Feb. , 1 958). 
V. The New Constitution 
In 1958, the British military had decided that it didn't 
need all of Cyprus as a base but simply bases in Cyprus. Once 
it was announced that the MacMillan Plan was to be enforced 
with Turkish co-operation alone, it was agreed that the Turkish 
Representative would arrive on October 1,'1958. 
The MacMillan Plan had several attractions for the Tur- 
kish Cypriots and for Turkey. It provided no central legislature 
which could be controlled by a Greek majority. On the contrary, 
its provision of separate communal assemblies and the later 
addition of separate municipalities provided useful stepping- 
stones to partition, should it need to be pursued in the future. 
(Stephens, 1966) (Hitchens, 1984). 
At the end of the same year, the fear over the possibility 
that the British would withdraw to their bases, and let Turkey 
invade and allow de facto partition of Cyprus, had a strong 
impact on the Greek government and the Greek Cypriot leader, 
Makarios. Additional pressures by the United States for a 
solution in order to avoid weakening the south-eastern flank 
of the NATO Alliance, made the Greek Government agree to nego- 
tiate over Cyprus with Turkey. The Greek Foreign Minister 
agreed with his Turkish opposite to a solution based on the 
future independence of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot leaders were 
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obliged to make the necessary concessions and retreat from 
their position of non-acceptance of the revised MacMillan pro- 
posals, in view of the approaching danger of Turkish partition 
demands. 
The five interested parties, that is, Greece, Turkey, 
Great Britain, the Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios, and, the 
Turkish Cypriot leaders, at two conferences in London and 
Zurich, signed an agreement for a new constitution for Cyprus, 
based on the revised MacMillan Plan. 
In the 1960 Constitutional agreements of London and 
Zurich, disproportionate guarantees were given in favour of the 
Turkish minority, which comprised 18^ of the total population, 
against the Greek-speaking majority of Cyprus. Furthermore, 
the constitution itself contained the seed of partition within 
it. It continued the British colonial practice of creating 
separate categories of citizenship -now designated as Greek and 
Turkish instead of the traditional ’’Muslim" and "non-Muslim". 
Some of the significant constitutional provisions were : 
1. Separate municipalities were provided for at a ratio of 
60^ Greek representation to a 401 Turkish representation. 
Greeks and Turks were to have separate local elections. 
2. Civil Service and Police posts where to be shared at a 
ratio of 701 Greek representation and 301 Turkish. 
3. The Army ratio was fixed at a 60%-40l. 
4. A 70^-301 ratio was to obtain in the House of Representa- 
tives and the Cabinet. The Turkish Vice President of the Re- 
public carried with him the right of veto. A "separate 
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majority” provision on matters concerning tax and the electoral 
law gave the Turkish Cypriot minority an additional right of 
veto in the House of Representatives. There, separate majori- 
ties of Greek and Turkish members were required to modify 
fiscal, electoral, or municipal laws. This meant that a bill 
supported by thirty five Greek and seven Turkish m.embers could 
be defeated by eight Turkish votes. Little wonder that this 
constitutional disequilibrium had negative effects on Cyprus. 
(Stephens, 1966), (Kyriakides, 1968), (Kuniholm, Orbis, 1983). 
VI. U.S. Interests in Cyprus arid the Eastern Mediterranean 
In the years 1945-1959, a parallel can be drawn between 
American interests in Cyprus and American interests in the East- 
ern Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
The internationalization of the Cyprus problem, hurt 
American interests in a number of ways : 
1) It threatened the cohesion of the new-born Western Alliance, 
only two years after the entry of Greece and Turkey into it. 
2) It threatened to dissolve the Balkan Pact, an alliance signed 
in 1954 between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, against the 
Soviet Balkan countries. The support that Yugoslavia was 
giving to the Greek demands automatically excluded Turkey from 
the alliance. 
3) It hindered Greek political and m.ilitary co-operation with 
the United States. 
4) It threatened to lead Greece and Turkey into an open military 
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confrontation. Such a Turkish-Greek confrontation would break 
the NATO defense system on its southern flank, and would invite 
Soviet involvement in the area. 
5) The Cyprus Question had a serious impact, and threatened to 
alter the internal political situation of Greece, w^hich had been 
carefully constructed in accordance with the Truman Doctrine by 
the Americans after the Civil War. 
6) The dispute created problems in the United Nations and pro- 
vided ground for Soviet propaganda. 
7) There was AKEL, the Communist Party of Cyprus, which was well 
organized and supported by a wide section of the population. 
CCoufoudakis, 1977), (Attalides, 1979). 
The broader U.S.interests in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and the Middle East were the following. From 1945, the major 
goal for the Americans was to prevent Soviet expansion in the 
Southern Balkans and the Northern Middle East. Until 1954, the 
U.S. had successfully defended their interests in these regions. 
In view of new situations, that is British withdrawal from the 
region, the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute, the Soviet pene- 
tration of Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean, the threat of 
neutrality and the rise of nationalism among the Arab states, 
as well as the need to secure the routes and resources of Middle 
Eastern Oil, the Cyprus dispute was seen as hurting this balance 
of power. The dispute was preventing the U.S. and Great Bri- 
tain from using Cyprus as a base for joint action in the area. 
Furthermore, it undermined the idea of containment against the 
Soviet Union (Coufoudakis, 1977), (Attalides, 1979). 
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As Harry Magdoff maintains, after the Second World War, 
the expansion of the socialist world intensifies the urgency to 
save as much as possible of the declining imperialist network. 
The post-Second World War era marks the new role of the United 
States as leader of the World System and main provider of aid 
and military assistance (Magdoff, 1966,1978). 
In 1953, the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, 
presented his idea of forming an organization as an anti-com- 
munist barrier of Muslim nations that extended between the 
Soviet Union and the Middle East. This agreement was signed in- 
1955, and named the ’'Bagdhad Pact". The Americans called the 
tune of the Bagdhad Pact, in’which they were members only in 
name. With the signing of the Pact the importance of Turkey 
became paramount for the national security of the U.S. Thus, 
the dilemma that the Cyprus Question was presenting for the U.S. 
was to solve the problem in such a way as to keep its two NATO 
allies -Greece and Turkey- satisfied, and within the sphere of 
NATO (Stephens, 1966) (Coufoudakis, 1977). 
As early as 1953, U.S. diplomacy started taking an active 
role in the Cyprus problem, thus stepping into Britain’s shoes. 
The line of divergence between the British and the United 
States policy was becoming clear. Britain was mainly interested 
in the Middle East’s oil resources, and was devoting her whole 
attention to Turkey as an ally and opposing Greek claims on 
Cyprus, while the Americans were interested in the unity between 
its allies, and with providing mutual defense arrangements 
between Greece and Turkey (Stephens, 1966). However, since 
Turkey became the only country in the Eastern Mediterranean 
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capable o£ substantial resistance to the Soviets, and the most 
significant in defending the Middle East and the Persian Gulf 
against Soviet attacks, Greece was the country where all the 
pressures were concentrated, in order to speed up the resolution 
of the dispute CKuniholm, Orbis, 1983). 
United States interests to make Cyprus available to NATO 
were known as early as 1957, when Dulles presented his plan for 
Cyprus at a NATO conference. Cyprus would become part of NATO 
and would be ruled by three commissioners. Internally, it would 
have some degree of self-government. 
Even before independence. Archbishop, later President 
Makarios had declared his intentions to seek support for the 
struggle of independence, "from East and West”. After indepen- 
dence, Makarios’ scope for non-alignment became greater. He 
was determined to move his country away from an alliance where 
Turkey carried such weight. 
Fdllowing independence Cypriot foreign policy was seen 
by the U.S. as hurting its interests in a number of ways : 
1) Instead of forming an anti-communist barrier with Greece and 
Turkey, Cyprus gave the local communists a respectable political 
role, including seats in the House of Representatives. 
2) The Cyprus Government had also signed a series of Treaties 
with the Soviet Union. 
3) Furthermore, Makarios attended a series of;conferences of the 
non-alligned nations, and developed close relations with social- 
ist , as well as, Arab leaders, like Tito of Yugoslavia and 
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Nasser o£ Egypt. 
In 1963, at an A£ro-Asian con£erence held in Nikosia, 
Makarios rea££irmed his intention to reject all military al- 
liances. Even at the times o£ crises, like the 1963 con£lict 
a little later he appealed £or assistance to Greece, the Soviet 
Union, Egypt, and the United Nations, thus rejecting any NATO 
mediation (Attalides, 1979). 
John Foster Dulles shared, along with his British col- 
legues, the contention that Turkey had interests equal to 
Greece’s in the future of the island and that a solution was to 
be found through Greco-Turkish talks, but limited within the 
scope of the Western Alliance. The Greek Government, in 
perfect loyalty with the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots, 
wanted to seek a solution through the United Nations. This was 
consistently, covertly, boycotted by the U.S. diplomacy, in a 
number of ways. Some examples are : 
1) Blocking the General Assembly’s agenda. 
2) Supporting neutral and negative resolutions 
3) Supporting resolutions that were openly opposed to Greece 
CCoufoudakis, 1977), (Xydis, 1967). 
The Zurich and London agreements that became the basis 
for the Constitution of Cyprus, were approved and guided in 
their design by U.S.diplomacy. 
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VII. Coristitutional Crises arid Ethnic Conflict 
According to the Zurich agreement which was part of the 
constitutional settlement, the Turkish Cypriots, who were 
earlier an insignificant political quantity, had suddenly 
acquired an altogether disproportionate importance. When the 
British left Cyprus, the proportion of Turkish Cypriots in the 
various grades of the Civil Service starting with the most 
senior grade, were : 261, 19°^, 20%, 181, 17%, 25%. The propor- 
tion of Turkish Cypriots in the. population was 18.5%, according 
to the census of 1960. According to the constitutional settle- 
ment, the proportion at all levels hadito be raised to 30% 
within five months of independence. 
The unworkability of the constitution and the disequili- 
brium of the unequal constitutional guarantees allotted to each 
community invited friction between the Greek and the Turkish 
Cypriots. Furthermore, it undermined Greco-Turkish relations. 
Immediately after Independence fights broke out over the 
constitutional issue. The 70/30 ratio of representation in the 
Public Service, the separate municipalities and the division of 
the army into social units were the major constitutional areas 
of tension that led to the conflict between the two ethnic 
groups (Foley, 1964), (Kyriakides, 1968), (Attalides, 1979). 
The simplest conflicts had to do with the allocation of 
jobs and economic resources. The Civil Service was already well 
staffed by tenured people. Two thousand Civil Service appoint- 
ments were appealed against in the Supreme Court between 1960 
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and 1963. The Greek Cypriots looked upon this provision of the 
constitution as causing the Greek Cypriot community a "loss of 
jobs" and furthermore, causing hardship to the Greek public 
servants in a discriminatory way. They complained as well that 
there were not enough qualified Turks to fill the posts. This 
problem as it developed, reminded each young civil servant that 
he and his community were in competition with the other communi- 
ty for these appointments. On the other hand, the Turkish Cy- 
priots looked upon the implementation of this provision as 
essential to securet'for the Turkish community adequate represen- 
tation in all spheres of government activity CKyriakides, 1968) 
CAttalides, 1979). The case went to the Supreme Court. Neither 
the Court nor the Public Service Commission was able to find a 
solution which vjould satisfy both sides. 
The separate Majority Vote created a new crisis in the 
area of Income Tax Law and contributed to the Constitutional 
breakdown. The inability to agree on the tax'legislation left 
the Government without,legal authorization to collect taxes. 
Both communities reverted to their Communal Chambers in order to 
pass separate Income Tax laws. This action dramatized the impor- 
tance of the Communal Chambers and placed the two communities 
further apart from each other. 
One of the most bitter battles, however, proved to be the 
Army deadlock. This was due to the veto granted to the President 
and Vice President, according to Article 50 of the Constitution. 
The provisions for the establishment of the Army w^ere not clear 
43 
to the two communities. The issue was, whether the Army would 
be formed on a separate or a mixed basis. The Council of Mini- 
sters on the one hand, decided to form the Army on a mixed 
basis at a 601/401 ratio of representation according to the 
Article 129 of the Constitution. The Vice President however, 
insisted on separation in accordance with the very same article. 
The Army deadlock was never solved, since the decisions were 
continually vetoed, alternatively by the President and the 
Turkish Vice President. 
The separate Municipalities provision was probably the 
greatest source of trouble in the 1960 Constitution. Under 
British rule there existed in Cyprus unified Municipalities. 
In 1958, during the anti-colonial struggle, however, the Tur- 
kish Cypriots established separate municipalities. In 1959, 
the British Colonial Administration gave ”de jure” recognition 
to the Turkish Cypriot municipalities. The 1960 Constitution 
(Article 188), provided for the President and the Vice President 
to come to a compromise solution with regards to the municipali- 
ties. The proposals that the Greek side drafted on the issue 
provided for unified municipalities, over fears of geographical 
partition. Naturally, they were rejected by the Turkish Vice 
President. The case went to the Supreme Court which had no 
power to solve the issue. 
The two ethnic groups of Cyprus formed themselves into 
two opposing groups with fixed positions toward the 1960 Consti- 
tution, were unable to function- within this constitutional 
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framework. 
The Greek Cypriots felt that they had set aside their 
aspiration of ’’enosis", only to gain less than proportional 
representation while contributing more heavily to the country's 
economy. The Turkish Cypriots, arguing that implementing the 
provisions of the 1960 Constitution was the only way to. cope 
with the majority, remained extremely suspicious of any sugges- 
tions.to change the constitutional status quo. For the Greek 
Cypriots, this uncompromising attitude to implement all the 
separatist provisions of the Constitution, was felt to be moti- 
vated by a desire to promote partition. 
Additionally, different Cold War alignments by the leaders 
of the two communities deepened the gap and increased the con- 
flict. The Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee meant that four 
sovereign states were now involved in the island. However, the 
President of Cyprus Makarios, was opposed to any- NATO interven- 
tion or mediation efforts in the affairs of Cyprus, contrary to 
the Turkish side which was accusing the President of allowing 
Communist infiltration in Cyprus, because of his policynof non- 
alignment CKyriakides, 1968), CAttalides, 1979). 
As a way out of the deadlocks of the Constitution, the 
Greek Cypriots began toi talk of "removing the negative elements” 
from the Constitution. In December 1963, Makarios informed the 
British, Greek and Turkish governments that he intended to amend 
the Constitution. He proposed a 13 point amendment which pro- 
vided for unified town councils, a unified army, and, the aboli- 
tion of the 70/30 ratio of representation in the Public Service. 
These were rejected by the Turkish Government. Makarios in 
turn, rejected the Turkish rejection. 
The tension that the Constitution had created and the 
deep frustration and separation that had enstranged and made 
the two communities hostile to one another, led to a violent 
conflict between them, and Greece and Turkey came to the brink 
of war over Cyprus. 
in the iHiddle of all these difficulties, the extremist 
groups were able to begin action. "Secret armies" had been 
organized by the extremists on both sides. The Turkish Cypriots 
were determined to prevent any Greek Cypriot attempts to bring 
about extra-constitutional solutions to the deadlocks. The 
Greek Cypriots were prepairing to stop the partitioning of the 
is land,and eventual intervention by Turkey. 
Once confrontation began during this crisis, the Turkish 
forces, both local and non-Cypriot, attempted to establish 
permanent positions. These strongholds were mainly positions 
which commanded crucial roads or communications and were not 
wdthin areas where Turksih civilians lived. A Turkish enclave 
was established on the northern coast, a fact that deeply 
alarmed the Greek Cypriots who feared the idea of opening a 
salient within easy reach of mainland Turkey [Hitchens, 1984). 
The "Green Line" separated the Greek from the Turkish 
sectors of Nicosia. All Turkish Cypriot civil servants remained 
in the Turkish sector and neither the President, nor the Mini- 
sters and House Members participated in the government. Physical 
separation o£ the two communities in a mixed society was now 
becoming a reality. The outlines of true geographical partition 
were slowly making their appearance, as well. 
Meanwhile, in 1964, Turkey threatened to intervene mili- 
tarily in Cyprus. U.S.President Johnson, concerned about the 
effects of a crisis on the southern flank of NATO, prevented the 
operation after a strong letter to Inonu, the Prime Minister of 
Turkey, informing him that the U.S. would not assist Turkey in 
the event of crisis with the Soviet bloc CKuniholm, Orbis , 
1983). Instead, Turkish jets flew low over Cyprus and bombar- 
ded several villages. 
VIII. The Increase of External Involvement and the 1974 Crisis 
The increase of external involvement in the affairs of 
Cyprus during the 1963-1964 crisis revealed the importance of 
Cyprus in the international power politics scene. Cyprus had 
become the centre of attention for NATO and the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union was at one time supporting Cyprus against 
NATO intervention. For the West, naturally the, major issue 
was the cohesion of the NATO alliance. Cyprus thus, as a non- 
aligned country became the centre of contradictory policies on 
the part of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. On some occasions 
the U.S. strengthened the independence of Cyprus if this was 
necessary to prevent a Greek-Turkish conflict. On some occa- 
sions the Soviet Union overlooked threats to the independence 
and non-alignment of Cyprus if there was a possibility of 
detaching one of the allies from the alliance (Attalides, 1979), 
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(Kuniholm, Orbis, Sum. 1985). 
Initially Great Britain as a Guarantor Power, took the 
part of playing the role of theopeace-keeper and was encouraged 
and supported in this role by the U.S. The Anglo-American 
efforts toward a political solution to the problem were centred 
upon providing a plan which would bring Cyprus under NATO 
control. In 1964, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Affairs Duncan Sandys proposed giving NATO countries a greater 
role in peacerkeeping operations in Cyprus. President Makarios 
rejected the-plan insisting that the 10.000 peace-keeping force 
in question, be selected by the U.N. Security Council. 
The failure of the British plan persuaded the U.S. to 
take a more active role in the problem of safeguarding U.S. 
interests within NATO. Under-Secretary of State George Ball, 
flew to London in order to assist in formulating a plan for 
Cyprus. Ball revived the original British plan to include 
European troops (as peace-keeping forces), from countries outside 
NATO. But again, the peace-keeping force would not be con- 
trolled in essence by the U.N. and Makarios rejected it. The 
Soviet Union gave full support to Makarios’ decision. The 
Greek Government of George Papandreou had accepted the plan, 
under heavy pressures from U.S. President Johnson, who warned 
Greece that the U.S. would not get involved in the event of a 
new Greco-Turkish confrontation over Cyprus, in which Greece 
was bound to be the loser. (Cyprus, Public Information Office, 
Cyprus __]^_The_Pr qblem_in_Pe rspective , Nicosia, 1 969). 
The problem for the U.S. was as follows. On the one hand, 
with a fully independent Cyprus the strategic interests of NATO 
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were in danger. On the other hand, if either Greece or Turkey 
intervened militarily, NATO cohesion would be threatened. The 
first problem could be solved by ending the independence of 
Cyprus and the second, by making the form of the termination 
the subject of agreement and territorial adjustment between 
Greece and Turkey. Since Greece had the upper hand because of 
her troops, Greece had to be convinced to accept partition under 
the guise of "union with Greece" (Attalides,1979), CKuniholm, 
Orbis , 1 983). 
The new U.S. plan designed for the future of Cyprus was 
presented by Dean Acheson. The basic idea was to declare union 
with Greece while ceding to Turkey : 
1) a large base in the Northern Karpasia area, 
2) three cantons with some form of local autonomy 
3) the Greek Aegean island of Kastellorizon. 
Both Greece and the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan as unaccept- 
able, indicating that this was another form of "double Enosis" 
or partition. For the U.S., the Acheson solution meant : 
1) Giving both NATO allies a slice of Cyprus which would end 
the quarrel and terminate the threat of the cohesion of NATO, 
2) Makarios, the radical supporter of non-alignment would be 
neutralized, 
3) the Republic would fall within the circle of NATO as a stra- 
tegic base in the Eastern Mediterranean (Foley, 1964), (Kyriaki- 
des, 1 968), (Attalides, 1 979), (Hitchens, 1 983). 
Although the plan was rejected, the political consequences 
of the Acheson proposal were enormous. On the one hand, the 
events in Cyprus created great tension between the relations of 
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the Cypriot government and the Greek government. This led to 
the weakening of the last parliamentary democracy in Greece. 
Finally, this created tension between Makarios of Cyprus and 
General Grivas of Greece CCoufoudakis, 1977). 
An event connected with the Acheson Plan was that while 
Acheson was trying to gain approval of his plan from the Greek 
Government, George Ball was trying to manipulate the conflict 
between Makarios and General Grivas (Weintal and Bartlett, 
1967). General Grivas, a fanatical anti-communist ex-EOKA 
fighter, was to return in Cyprus with the encouragement of 
’’western diplomatic circles”, to command Greek troops and to help 
check pro-Communist feeling in Cyprus. He was backed by U^S. 
Intelligence. In his secret meeting with Grivas, Ball gained 
the General’s approval for a plan that provided for ’’Enosis” of 
Cyprus with Greece, and at the same time the ceding of bases to 
Turkey and to NATO. In this way, the major obstacle to these, 
Makarios, would be removed (Weintal and Bartlett, 1967). 
Makarios protested against the involvement of Grivas and 
the stationing of Greek troops in Cyprus (The Economist, July 4, 
1964). Two years later, Grivas was accused of having launched 
attacks on Turkish villages. 
In 1964, Makarios negotiated an agreement with the Soviet 
Union for anti-aircraft weapons to strengthen Cyprus’ defences 
against future Turkish air-attacks (The Economist, August 22, 
1964). At the same time the Soviet Union began to use the 
Cyprus dispute to lure Turkey away from NATO. Turkey, which 
was offended, due to Johnsons’s intervention to prevent an 
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invasion o£ Cyprus, was eventually able to get Soviet support 
for an "independent and federated Cyprus" CKyriakides, 1968). 
One thing was certain at this point, that the attempts 
to enforce and preserve peace through NATO mediations, had 
failed. Since there were no other alternative solutions to the 
problem, the U.S. and Britain finally accepted the idea of 
assistance from the U.N. The Security Council resolution pro- 
vided for both the placing of a U.N. peace-keeping force in 
Cyprus, and of a mediator, in order to reconcile the two sides 
and find, through bilateral talks, the basis which would re- 
place the 1959 constitutional agreements. 
The U.N. mediation efforts toward a political solution of 
the problem met with little success. Despite this fact, U.N. 
mediation continued to be effective for a period of 10 years. 
The mediator, Galo Plaza, undertook a comprehensive study of the 
situation in Cyprus. He commented that all solutions that the 
U.S. had pursued in the previous years were not applicable to 
the Cypriot reality. He rejected any idea of partition or 
federation for obvious political, economic and social reasons. 
He indicated the urgency for Cyprus to become a demilitarized 
zone, a "fully independent" state, under the rule of the majori- 
ty, thus rejecting the constitutional agreements. 
Naturally, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots rejected Plaza’s 
Report (U.N. Security Council, S/6253, 26-3-65). As a result 
Galo Plaza resigned as U.N. mediator. Any other efforts of me- 
diation undertaken by Representatives of the Secretary-General, 
were underminded by parallel mediation efforts of American and 
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NATO representatives. This period o£ U.N. mediation v/as any- 
thing but "harmful” to U.S. interests in Cyprus. In fact, U.S. 
policy was relaxed, assured by the fact that the possibility of 
a direct Greco-Turkish conflict was weakening. 
At a local level, however, the tension in Cyprus heightened, 
thus strengthening the possibility of a direct confrontation 
between Greece and Turkey. Armed irregulars from both Cypriot 
communities, plus infiltration of military personnel from Greece 
and Turkey constantly increased the threat of violence. 
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In 1967 new battles took place, after Grivas the right- 
wing extremist launched attacks on Turkish villages. Turkey, 
issued an ultimatum to Greece and mobilized for an invasion of 
thfe island. The United States, with Cyrus Vance as a mediator, 
once again prevented the war, which would have probably involved 
the Soviet Union. Since Greece was this time responsible for 
the Cypriot troubles, she made all the major concessions. 
Grivas, as well as the Greek troops were withdrawn, thus weaken- 
ing Cyprus’ defensive capabilities. 
The continued stalemate on Cyprus, in conjunction with 
the Soviet-Turkish rapprochement and the inability of the U.N. 
to solve the problem, led to increasing Turkish pressures for 
bilateral talks with Greece. The prospects of a dialogue took 
a new turn for the worse after the April 1967 military coup in 
Athens. The most serious change was the permanent clash be- 
tween the Cypriot Government and the Government in Athens. The 
military junta was ideologically in complete opposition to 
Makarios’ liberal, non-aligned policy. The new military regime, 
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isolated both at home and abroad wanted desperately, for reasons 
of prestige to resolve the Cyprus Problem, a problem that 
for years had haunted both Greek and international politics. 
At a secret meeting at Evros, Greece offered Turkey -without 
the consent of the Cypriots- a large military base on Cyprus, 
in return for union of the island with Greece. Turkey, wanting 
more concessions on the part of the Greeks, rejected the plan 
(Kyriakides, 1968). 
In such an environment of mistrust as this, the psycholo- 
gical repercussions in each community were enormous. The Turkish 
Cypriots felt they could not live with the Greeks, unless they 
were physically separated. The Greek Cypriots believed the 
Turks were purposely trying to promote partition, through physic- 
al separation of the two communities. 
The worsening of the relations between Athens and Nicosia 
continued after the 1967 Greco-Turkish confrontation over 
Cyprus. In 1968, there was an attempted assassination of the 
Greek dictator Papadopoulos, in which two leading Cypriots had 
been implicated by Athens (Coufoudakis, 1977). 
After the 1967 confrontation, the general policy emphasis 
of the U.S. State Department shifted to supporting Cypriot 
independence, through the process of inter-communal negotiations. 
Makarios, however, remained for the U.S. a disturbing factor to 
the solution of the Cyprus dispute. 
Beginning in 1970, the Greek Colonels began a sustained 
campaign against Makarios which failed, following the trial 
and heavy convictions which fell on the shoulders of the Greek 
officers sent over to Cyprus by the Greek junta. These officers 
were secretly training, arming and forming a terrorist organiza- 
tion to overthrow Makarios (Hitchens, 1984). "Der Spiegel" in 
the Spring of 1970, revealed a secret plan designed by Greek 
officers to firstly, overthrow Makarios with the assistance of 
the Cypriot National Guard and then to partition Cyprus with 
Turkey. The notorious Colonel loannides, was the author of 
this plan. 
The involvement of the United States and the CIA in the 
Greek military coup in Athens and the period of subversion and 
terror (1970-74) in Cyprus, is beyond the scope of this study. 
It is sufficient to mention though that a major task of U.S. 
foreign policy was its determination to solve the Cyprus 
problem, in a way consistent with perceived American interests. 
An independent non-aligned Cyprus was viewed by the U.S. as a 
potential threat to U.S. interests, and Makarios had been 
labelled by the U.S. as the "Castro of the Mediterranean". In 
fact, the urgency of incorporating Cyprus into NATO became more 
immediate after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, and the continuing 
Middle East crisis (Couloumbis and Hicks, 1975), (Stern, 1977). 
Between 1972-1974, EOKA B, a terrotist organization formed 
to overthrow Makarios and divide the island with Turkey, was 
causing the greatest trouble to the Cypriot Government. More- 
over, this trouble was made worse by the fact that the Cypriot 
National Guard had been infiltrated by EOKA-B members. 
The second military coup in Athens, in 1973, led to a 
54 
suspension of the secret Greco-Turkish talks on Cyprus. Colonel 
loannides became the most influential man in the last Greek 
■gunt a. 
In 1974, EOKA-B was declared an illegal organization. 
Makarios sent a letter to President-General Gyzikis of Greece, 
accusing Athens of complicity both in the activities of EOKA-B, 
and in efforts to assassinate him, the At^.chibishop. The letter 
also contained an ultimatum requesting Greece to remove the 
1,000 officers from the Cypriot National Guard CEthnikos Kyrix, 
July 11-12, 1974). 
As early as June 27, both the U.S. Ambassador Henry Tasca 
and the CIA Station Chief, had reported to Washington that a 
coup d’etat in Nicosia was a real possibility (Bell, Orbis, 
1974). However, although the ex-dictator Papadopoulos had simil- 
ar designs to move against Makarios, these plans were to be 
implemented along with Turkey. Colonel loannides, counting on 
the United States diplomacy to prevent a possible Turkish in- 
vasion, instigated a coup d'etat against Makarios. Makarios’ • 
and his legal Government were replaced with Greek officers 
known for their dedication in the "enosis” cause. As shown 
earlier, the Nixon Administration which was well informed about 
the course of events, however, chose not to stop them (Stern, 
1977), (Hitchens, 1984). 
This provided the opportunity for Turkey to land troops 
on Cyprus, thus interpreting rather "broadly" the Treaty of 
Guarantee. This Turkish response : a large-scale invasion of 
the island -under the name of a "peace-keeping operation"- 
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led to Turkish occypation of 401 of the island’s soil, forcibly 
exchanging its population, and thus creating territorial separa- 
tion between the two communities. In 1983, nine^^years after 
the invasion, the Turkish authorities declared the occupied 
area an independent Turkish state, thus formalizing the 1974 
partition (U.N, Yearbook, 1983), 
IX. The Cohsequehces of Partition 
Since 1974, the Turkish military occupation has been the 
dominant fact of Cyprus. From East to West the island is di- 
vided as sharply as Berlin, with 39^ of the territory, about 
201 of the population and 65% of the productive economy in 
Turkish hands. About 30,000 Turkish soldiers remain on Cypriot 
soil, and 25,000 Turkish settlers from the mainland have been 
brought to fill the posts that the Greek Cypriots left behind 
when they fled from Turkish occupied Cyprus. 
All Greek-speaking Cypriots were expelled from the North 
while the Turkish Cypriots of the South have been transferred 
to the North to created the grounds for territorial partition. 
The demographic structure of the island has been totally 
altered. Unlike any other situation of divided states, the 
border of Cyprus may not be crossed for any reason whatsoever 
by a Cypriot citizen. 
Gradually the South of Cyprus, overcrowded by Greek-speak- 
ing refugees, started building an economy. The economy has 
been booming and the South has almost become the prime financial 
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and business centre for the whole of the Middle East. Most of 
the tourist trade until 1974 was in the two areas of the North, 
Famagusta and Kyrenia, now occupied by Turkish troops and part 
of the ’’Turkish Federated State of Cyprus”. Tourist centres 
have been built in the South which has become a new area of 
attraction for European and Middle Eastern travellers. 
On the other side, the Turkish Cypriot administration is 
fighting a losing battle to keep the economy afloat. Whole 
cultivated areas that have fallen into Turkish hands remain 
abandoned and tourist resorts are like ghost towns. The economy 
of Northern Cyprus is heavily dependent on Turkey. The Turkish 
Cypriot authoritarian leadership is:blaming this economic defeat 
on the ’’economic blockade” imposed by the Greek Cypriot govern- 
ment. Indeed,.occupied parts of Cyprus have been declared 
closed to navigation by the officially recognized Cypriot Govern- 
ment. Ships that visit northern parts are blacklisted and 
their master is liable for prosecution if his ship calls later 
at a government controlled port. 
The inter-communal talks that have been initiated between 
the two Cypriot sectors, under the auspices of the United Na- 
tions, have stalled on several major points. The Turkish 
Cypriot President of the Federated State promotes the notion of 
a ’’confederation”. This consists of a nation with two quasi- 
independent states with two economic policies, two foreign poli- 
cies and, internal boundaries which citizens may not cross with- 
out internal passports. He is prepared to reduce the Turkish 
held territory. However, the stumbling block to agreement 
remains the Turkish insistence on equal status for the two com- 
munities, with equal rights to mineral resources, air space and 
freedom to enter close relations with the respective mother 
countries. 
The Greek Cypriots are willing to make some major conces- 
sions, without however abandoning their demand for immediate 
removal of foreign armies from Cypriot soil. Additionally, 
they push for the possibility of allowing 12,000-30,000 Greek 
Cypriots to return to the northern town of Varosha, reoccupy 
their homes and operate their hotels and businesses. 
What the sources cited in this chapter reveal is that 
ethnic differentiation between the two ethnic communities of 
Cyprus began at the point where British administrative practices 
combined with nationalist influences from Greece and Turkey. 
An additional system of external links provi’ded the basis from 
which power politics in the area can be easily felt in Cyprus. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTERNAL FORCES AND THE CYPRUS CONFLICT 
The previous chapter presented an historical overview 
of the Cyprus problem. 
It is the task of Chapter 2 to examine domestic develop- 
ments in order to appreciate fully the effects and real ’’gravi- 
ty” of the external influences and interventions in the island’s 
affairs. The indigenous forces to be discussed constitute the 
basis on which the external forces will be analysed in the fol- 
lowing chapters. In order to examine the issue of internal 
ethnic relations between the two communities of Cyprus, two 
levels of historical developments will be discussed : 
1. Relations of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, in their every- 
day life. It is necessary to begin at the point where con- 
flict was absent in the relations of the two communities. 
2. Relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and their poli- 
tical and social systems with reference to the economic, 
cultural, religious and military realities, on the island. 
It is important to establish whether the relations of the 
two ethnic communities, with their errors and weaknesses alone, 
were sufficient to create separation and lead to the present 
and continuing crisis on Cyprus. 
I, Everyday Relations of the Cypriots 
The overwhelming tenor of the literature of social 
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scientists, journalists, and political figures who became in- 
volved with the Cyprus dispute, or who conducted studies on 
the spot, leads to the astonishing conclusion that in the 
everyday social relations of the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus 
rivalry and distrust were, and are, until recently surprising- 
ly weak. In fact, these very same relations could not have 
constituted the basis for divisive solutions to the Cyprus 
problem. 
Evidence of peaceful co-existence of the two groups can 
be traced back to the Ottoman period. During Ottoman rule there 
took place a substantial number of conversions from Christia- 
nity to Islam. As described earlier in this thesis, this ex- 
plains similarities in patterns of life, other than the religious 
life of the two ethnic groups. 
Until very recently there existed whole villages of 
Greek-speaking Muslims. Also, various phenomena of dual reli- 
gious allegiance and religious syncretism had been recorded, 
on the part of Muslims, and these only disappeared with the 
development of nationalism. 
Perhaps the strongest elements in the traditional co- 
existence are interdependent patterns of economic and ritual 
relations. A characteristic of Cypriot society was the ’’merchant 
intermediary”, through whom the merchandise of the peasant 
producer was marketed and credit was provided by him to the 
peasant. This system survived until 1974. Until, then, Greek 
Cypriot intermediaries werecbuying goods from Turkish Cypriot 
peasants (Attalides, 1979). 
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Another traditional element was share-cropping. By this 
process, the surplus land of one family was combined with the 
surplus labour of another family. Share-cropping arrangements 
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots went on until 1974. 
In the area of ritual relations, weddings and coffee- 
shops were the socializing occasions and places, respectively, 
that determined the degree of belonging to a given social reali- 
ty. The importance of the coffee-shop can be demonstrated by 
the fact that coffee-shop owners with political allegiances 
with the left or right, have separate coffee-shops in Cyprus, 
which only people of their own political ideology frequent. 
Until 1974, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus sat together in the same 
coffee-shops. 
At weddings, the Greek Cypriot family would place a large 
candle in the Mosque of the Turkish village, which meant an 
open invitation to all their Turkish neighbours (Attalides, 
1979). 
It has been recorded that even when the Greek and the 
Turkish sectors of Cyprus had turned into battle-fields and 
its inhabitants had to undergo repeated exchanges of population, 
in mixed villages, Turkish and Greek Cypriots could still be 
seen living peacefully together. 
In a -.survey carried out by Stanley Kyriakides, immediate- 
ly after the 1964 crisis, it was shown that inter-communal rela- 
tions were significantly better in the rural areas than in the 
towns, where only 10% of Greek Cypriots blamed the Turkish 
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Cypriots for the troubles. In both communities the majority 
was well aware of the common interests of the "ordinary people" 
and did not blame their Orthodox or Muslim neighbours for the 
inter-communal trouble (Kyriakides, 1968). 
Brigadier Harbottle for example, describes how in the 
middle of the 1967 fighting in mixed villages, members of both 
ethnic communities were seen co-operating and helping one 
another to get to.; safety. In the Paphos district, Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot villagers were withessed helping each other to 
escape along the country roads, with the assistance of the 
UNFICYP personnel. Elsewhere, at the height of the 1967 con- 
flict, members of the two communities were sitting together in 
the same coffee-houses exchanging Christmas gifts (Harbottle, 
1 970) . 
These are also accounts of assistance by Turkish to Greek 
CA'priots, and vice versa during events of the 1 974 . Again 
Brigadier Harbottle, in an article he wrote later in 1974, 
testifies to this fact. There, he claims ..."one could imagine 
that such relations would have been severely or badly mauled as 
a result of recent events, but no, the co-operation and co- 
existence remains as firm as before. Many are the examples 
during the fighting, where human relations and standards of 
civilized behaviour requiring a degree of courage of the persons 
involved, have triumphed over ethnic differences". (Harbottle, 
The Times, 17-10-74). 
These instances of human relations reveal that the rela- 
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tions o£ the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus at an everyday level, 
could not have constituted the basis for separatism let alone 
for partition of the island. On the contrary, the evidence 
shows that the Greeks and the Turks of Cyprus wanted in nearly 
every instance to get relationships back to normal, and to live 
peacefully with their neighbours. The evidence also reveals 
that the story of animosity between the Greeks and the Turks 
of Cyprus is'^a myth and has been promoted for purposes foreign 
to the Cypriot ethnic communities. 
In fact, as mentioned earlier, one can trace back 
problems of inter-communal relations to foreign intervention 
from colonial imperialist powers, Britain and the U.S., or from 
Turkey and Greece. 
In the 50’s the British, by recruiting Turkish Cypriots 
to the Auxiliary Police Force, disturbed the balance of peace- 
ful co-existence and managed to turn the two communities against 
one another. When a Pan-Cypriot trade union organization 
-organized by the Cypriot Communist party AKEL- was formed, 
aiming at(uniting Turkish and Greek Cypriots along common class 
lines, the British discouraged the promotion of such cooperation. 
Furthermore, when some trade unionists were murdered, and 
their clubs burnt down, the British did not prosecute the insti- 
gations of these arsons. After independence, it was the Turkish 
and the Greek Governments that put mainland and local extremists 
into commanding positions in Cyprus, by giving them money and 
weapons. And when President Makarios started'acting like a 
Cypriot, the Greek junta dddided to remove him. Above all. 
where the British had made an opportunistic use of the so-called 
Greek-Turkish Cypriot rivalry and distrust, the U.S. made an 
instrument of it. 
This thesis, however, would be incomplete if it failed 
to examine the political, economic and social systems of the 
Greek and the Turkish communities, and account for their 
mistakes and missed opportunities in their recent history. 
Curiously enough, it had become obvious to the Cypriots 
around 1967, that ’’enosis" or "taksim” would have meant a defi- 
nite economic loss for both communities, and a transformation 
of Cyprus into a remote province of either Greece or Turkey 
or both. However, if economic and social interests had been 
left undisturbed to determine the attitudes and behaviour or 
both Greek and Turkish Cypriots at"the level of everyday life, 
a common Cypriot interest could have evolved in the long run. 
II. Relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in their poli- 
tical, social and economic systems 
Economically, the Turkish minority, despite its pri- 
vileged status, were in essence an underprivileged group. It 
appeared in the Independence period that there was a "stingi- 
ness” on the part of the central governm.ent, in allocating 
economic aid, or in the sharing of the resources for education 
and housing. In a way, the Turkish minority felt like "second- 
class citizens", compared to the Greek majority. This, in 
social terms, was a problem. Greek trade unionists made efforts 
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to enlist Turkish Cypriots as fellow workers. The absence of 
a specific development program for the Turkish community, 
made the gap between the two communities, even wider. 
The matter is not as simple as this, however. Additional 
literature on this issue explains the reasons why the Turkish 
Cypriot economy was inferior to its Greek counter-part. 
In 1963, production was, in most sectors, in Greek hands. 
This did not make the Turkish Cypriots inferior, it simply meant 
that there was a higher^incidence of businessmen and profession- 
als among the Greek Cypriots. This was because the bourgeoisie 
in Cyprus was mainly Greek Cypriot. A brief look at the 
economic relations of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots before and 
during British rule explains this peculiarity. 
Going back to the internal social evolution of the Otto- 
man Empire, the Greeks along with other Christian, nationalities, 
started on the road of economic modernization, earlier than the 
Turks. The traditional ruling-class position of the Turks as 
administrators and landowners, did not encourage economic enter- 
prise, which was left in the hands of the Greeks (Jeness, 1962). 
Thus, the Cypriot bourgeoisie, the entrepreneurial class 
especially, was Greek rather than Turkish. This situation did 
not change in the period of British rule. During that period, 
the Turks showed an inadequate participation in the more 
modernized sectors of the economy, a problem originating in 
their historically conditioned delay in economic modernization 
(Kitromilides, 1977). Thus, such economic inequalities that 
continued operating in the British colonial period, and later. 
in the post-independence period, were due to historical and 
cultural factors, not political ones. 
The changes that took place during the period of British 
rule were bound to affect the Greek Cypriots more than the 
Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots, had a business oriented 
tradition which helped them to develop a middle class with a 
high incidence of businessmen and professionals, whereas the 
Turkish Cypriots, the overwhelming majority at least, remained 
small farmers. This largely explains the differences between 
the standards of'living of the two ethnic.groups until 1960. 
Later, as will be suggested, this business oriented tradition, 
explains the prosperity achieved by the Greek Cypriots in the 
South of Cyprus, after the 1974 war and partition, despite the 
devastation it experienced from the war, and the burden of the 
number of refugees there. This economic differentiation be- 
tween the two communities became intensified in the post-inde- 
pendence period. 
Returning to the issue of Turkish inferiority in the 
post-independence period, if members of both communities had 
participated in the same trade unions, then reduction of the 
Turkish population to a position of inferiority would have been 
prevented. 
One of the reasons which explains the inferiority of the 
Turkish Cypriot economy after 1963, is the ’’Buy Turkish Cam- 
paign”. This policy, among a population of 100,000, was bound 
to lead to a lower standard of living.- Furthermore, the Turkish 
leadership's attempts to set up separate Turkish Cypriot 
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industries and facilities, produced the same result, a lower 
standard of living for Turkish Cypriots. 
Other important factors that reinforced the economic 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and fostered their inferior 
status were the following : 
1) Status insurance pa>Tnents to Turkish Cypriots were hindered. 
According to research conducted by an American political 
scientist, this happened because the Turkish Cypriots had been 
unwilling to admit the government’s legitimacy by allowing go- 
vernment insurance officers and welfare workers to carry out 
the requested inspections and verifications, even under UNFICYP 
auspices (Stegenga, 1968). 
In other cases the problem was the claim of exclusive 
control of people and areas, by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. 
2) Until 1969, the Turkish Cypriots received almost no benefit 
from aid to Cyprus, from the UND development program. The 
evidence shows that this happened because the Turkish leader- 
ship insisted on receiving aid from the United Nations directly, 
a demand which the U.N, turned down. Of course, individuals 
could apply to the Cyprus Government for participation in UNDP 
financed projects. The Turkish leadership, however, exerted 
pressures and discouraged such actions by its community (Attali- 
des, 1979). 
3) It was reported from UNFICYP and the U.N.Security Council, 
that in 1964, the Turkish leadership was prohibiting members of 
its community to ; a) enter the Greek sector without a permit, 
b) and to trade with the Greek Cypriots. A fine, or imprisonment 
- 67 - 
was the penalty i£ these two were infringed, c) Associating 
with Greek Cypriots in any way, and visiting their hospitals 
was also subject to heavy fines (Report by the U.N. Secretary 
General, Nikosia, 1974). 
What is noteworthy is the fact that the Turkish com- 
munity of Cyprus developed a left-wing political movement. This 
movement was a step forward towards reintegration. Its ideolo- 
gy was to stress social rights for workers of both communities , 
and consequently de-emphasized the ethnic strains that national- 
ism had created. 
A series of positive changes could have been obtained at 
a political, social and economic level. In time, economic 
inequalities could have been controlled, or even minimized, and 
co-existence would have been nurtured. However, since the 
Turkish Community was economically, heavily dependent on Turkey, 
this movement was eliminated by nationalist organizations, 
organized in Turkey itself. (Attalides, 1977, 1979), (Kitromi- 
lides, 1977). 
In addition, the contradictions involved in the neglect 
of Turkish Cypriot interests by the Greek Cypriot leadership, 
are twofold. If there had been a real effort to develop special 
economic development programs, this would have been opposed 
by the Greek Cypriot enterpreneurs, whose interest was in cheap 
Turkish labour. By the; same token, the Turkish Cypriot leader- 
ship would have turned down such a scheme, in order to keep its 
community isolated and maintain their monopoly of exploiting 
Turks only by Turks. 
Culturally and religiously, as mentioned earlier, there 
were certain similarities between the two communities. Several 
Christian and Muslim rites had been adopted by the ethnic 
groups centuries before and there was a sense of a' shared common 
culture. How^ever, Turkish culture was different from the Greek, 
a fact which the Greek Cypriot Government had failed to under- 
stand. Consequently, it had not set up any institutions spe- 
cifically designed to meet Turkish cultural and religious needs. 
Educationally, there was no effort to emphasize a spe- 
cifically Cypriot history, through school history and literature 
curricula, and given the pervasiveness of both dominant main- 
land ideologies, another opportunity to raise a-common poli- 
tical consciousness was missed. 
At the political level, another dimension of the problem 
was the place the Greek Orthodox Church occupied in Greek 
Cypriot life. It was considered to be the guardian of national 
feeling and consciousness which had'generated the ’’enosis 
cause”. The contradictory position of Archbishop Makarios as 
head of State, representing both ethnic communities of Cyprus, 
and also as head of the majority's religious community, meant 
he was representing only one of the two communities, and so 
made it' very difficult for the Turkish Cypriots to identify 
with the new order, during and after independencec However, 
a valid argument would very well be that the Archbishop was the 
only person capable of following a policy of independence, 
leading his people away from the "enosis cause”, with its 
right-wing orientation, and with no opposition from the Church. 
For all we know, the Church would have not allowed any other 
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politician to let the "enosis cause" weaken. This accomodation 
of course, created problems that were reflected in culture and 
education. It also made the Turkish Cypriots sceptical, that 
the Government of Cyprus was not totally legitimate-'in their 
eyes (Kadritzke & Wagner, 1979). 
These problems, however, could be very well understood 
if one thinks that the Church could not be the vanguard of ex- 
plicit ideological re-orientation. Makarios was walking on 
thin ice trying to create a fine balance out of all these 
seeming contradictions and potential conflicts. 
A different aspect of the complex Cypriot crisis that 
contributed to the destruction of the Cypriot State, was the 
presence of foreign military forces on Cypriot soil. Under the 
Treaty of Guarantee, it was legal to allow mainland Greek and 
Turkish armies to settle permanently on the island, a fact 
which was thoroughly exploited by the two mother countries of 
the Cypriots. President Makarios later admitted to such 
mistakes. In a self-criticism, shortly after the military coup 
against him, and the Turkish invasion, he regretted how losely 
the Treaty of Guarantee had'been interpreted, and he confessed 
his inability to resist foreign military infiltration in 
Cyprus. 
However, as mentioned earlier, when he attempted to 
dissociate his Government from that of both Greece and Turkey, 
he was met with opposition from both countries. A few days 
before his legal Government was overthrown, Makarios wrote a 
letter to Greece's military'leader, President Gizikis, accusing 
the Greek army officers of subversion and demanding that they 
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be removed from Cyprus. A few days later, he accused the Greek 
dictatorship of directing and financing EOKA-B, which was aiming 
at the dissolution of independence of the Cypriot State. The 
response was his removal as head of state, and the eventual 
partition of Cyprus. 
It is evident then that even the most serious mistakes 
of the Cypriot ethnic communities, in their social and political 
relations, could only be described as imposed mistakes. 
Although ethnic inequalities did exist, they were a product of 
cultural factors, inherited from the Ottoman period of rule. 
During British rule 'ethnic inequalities'were overtly exploited through 
British administrative practices. In the post-independence 
period elimination of these inequalities would have meant fol- 
low^ing different policiesrand transforming the face of Cypriot 
society altogether. There were major obstacles to this : 
Firstly, it would necessitate attempting to attract the 
mass of Turkish Cypriots into fuller integration with the 
Cypriot economy. 
Secondly, it would have meant confronting the Turkish 
leadership, which was disrupting Turkish Cypriot links with the 
Cyprus trade union movement. The Turkish leadership was acting 
so as to discourage the Turkish Cypriots, arguing the need for 
unity against the majority. 
Any feeling, attempt, or desire for the natural rules 
of social and ideological development to take its course, were 
faced with constant outside mainland intervention. Thus, the 
task of minimizing, and even eliminating these two major ob- 




FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 
In Chapter 3 the complex issue of involvement and inter- 
vention of external forces in Cyprus will be discussed. These 
external developments will be examined and related to the 
domestic processes and actions analysed in the previous chapter, 
in order to reveal the basic structures of inter-dependence 
between these levels of development. The purpose of this 
Chapter will be to demonstrate that : 
1) The use of pressures by external forces has been crucial for 
the separation of, and the political disintegration in Cyprus, 
but also that 2) internal realities themselves -institutional 
structures, the rise of nationalism, behaviour, and so on- were 
to a large-extent the consequences of external factors. 
In addition, it will be shown that the Cypriot communi- 
ties ’ attachments to their mother-countries provided the means 
through which domestic processes in Cyprus could be influenced 
and directed from outside. 
The Cyprus problem, the way it has unfolded, involved 
questions of nationality, of inter-communal relations, of. 
strategy and of geo-politics. 
Recorded Cypriot history is principally that of the 
exploitation of the island as a staging post to somewhere else 
by the dominant power of the time. This, in time was replaced 
by its exploitation by a number of powers instead of one : 
Greece, Turkey, the U.S, and Britain. 
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Intervention by imperialist powers in the Cuprus problem 
has always been caused by military-strategic interests rather 
than economic interests. Cyprus’ geographical position places 
it at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa, situated as 
it is only 40 miles from Turkey, just over 100 miles from Syria 
and Lebanon, and 180 miles from Israel. 
Just as Cyprus' geographically strategic position led to 
the internal conflict on the island from the post-Ottoman 
period until now the material cited in this thesis reveals that 
ethnicity and religion in themselves were not sufficient to 
bring about this internal conflict, given the existence of 
states;in which cultural diversity persists within the frame- 
work of a common nationality. Viewed from a historical pers- 
pective, there was no necessity or inevitability leading to 
ethnic differentiation. To understand the historical develop- 
ments that brought ethnic conflict, one must view them in terms 
of the processes of.change. In many states, the ethnic reli- 
gious or tribal conflict seems to be the outcome of colonial 
policies in the state’s early years and, of the continued 
domination by foreign powers in the internal affairs of newly 
created sovereign states. 
In order to analyse the external forces of intervention 
involved in the Cyprus conflict, one has to examine historical 
developments at 3 levels : 
1. The Rise of Nationalism under British Colonial Rule. 
2. Relations between Greece and the Greek Cypriots and similarity, 
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, in order to reconstruct the 
rising level of foreign power intervention. 
3, Relations between the United States, Greece and Turkey, with 
reference to the Cypriots, in order to determine the level of 
political and military alliances between the three countries. 
If one has studied Cyprus under the Ottoman rule, one 
cannot fail to overlook the fact that a traditional society 
such as Cyprus, which shared a common culture, where existing 
differences were not of political significance, did not succeed 
in forming a politically cohesive state, but became increasing- 
ly differentiated. There are numerous examples of groups within 
states that form different religious, cultural and ethnic enti- 
ties. These differences, it needs to be stressed, may or may 
not be divisive nor may they lead to inter-group conflict. The 
process of transformation of Cypriot society began with British 
colonial rule. 
I. The Rise of Nationalism under British Colonial Rule 
The religious but apolitical differences between Muslim.s 
and Eastern Orthodox Christians were perceived by the British 
in nationalist terms. Through colonial rule they politicized 
these differences and transformed the two ethnic communities 
into competing political and nationalist groups. This was in 
sharp contrast with the ’’Millet" system of Control by the 
Ottoman Empire, where groups were defined along religious and 
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class lines, with class frequently cutting across religious 
barriers, w^hile political authority was' legitimately in the 
hands of the Sultan of Turkey. 
Among observable changes that the British introduced 
into Cyprus were, the training of an indigenous civil service, 
the introduction of a new legal system and a program of litera- 
cy. The new educational system especially led to the creation 
of two discrete political cultures w^hereby the Muslim and 
Orthodox Christians learned different languages, histories and 
ideologies. Young Cypriots went to study at the universities 
in Greece and Turkey, and attachment to their respective mother- 
lands was thus intensified. Greek nationalism grew from main- 
land teachers sent to Cypriot schools and was spread’ to Cyprus, 
thus providing a basis for a nationalist belief system (Kitro- 
milides , 1 9 77). 
The addition of political functions by the British to 
the "Millets" further divided the two communities, and fostered 
the development of two parallel social systems. 
Following a policyfof indirect rule, the British relied 
on local power structures in managing domestic affairs, and, 
as a rule, discouraged ethnic integration. Thus, by preserving 
and then politicizing traditional power structures, such as 
the Orthodox Church and its civil functions, they provided its 
leadership with the potential impetus for ethnic conflict 
CKitromilides, 1977). 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the British intro- 
duced a series of economic and social changes which affected 
the Greek Cypriots more than the Turkish Cypriots. This 
peculiarity was the product of cultural factors. The Greeks, 
a business oriented ethnic group formed a bourgeoisie which 
was trained according to the British tradition and became a 
powerful economic factor, a process in which the Turkish 
Cypriots were left behind. This economic change and social 
mobilization were the preconditions for the intensification of 
nationalist demands. The consequence was that the system of 
horizontal interethnic bonds forged in a traditional society 
were gradually undermined and eventually broken for good. If 
social and cultural change provided the internal dynamic of 
ethnic differentiation, British colonial policy marked the 
beginning of this process. 
So, from the first years of British colonial rule, that 
is the first decades of the 20th century, Cyprus became increa- 
singly polarized between Greeks and Turks and this resulte*d in 
nearly complete segragation of the two communities and the 
gradual formation of two nations. In time, and in this way, 
separate antagonistic nationalities were promoted, which were 
fighting for political power, and for control over the same 
territory, while the development of a single cultural identity 
was hindered. 
It has been underlined and established earlier that 
Cyprus was, to the British from the very beginning, a key base 
to Western Asia and a launching pad for intervention in the 
Middle East; it was also governed as a Crown colony. The 
significance of this in strategic and geo-political terms be- 
comes paramount if one considers that Cyprus remained, until 
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1959, the only country in Europe to be part of a modern European 
Empire. This, however, became even more important in interna- 
tional politics, specifically at the First United Nations 
debate where the self-determination of Cyprus was opposed on 
the grounds that the continuation of the colonial status of 
the island was impottant for the defence of Southern Turkey and 
the Mediterranean in general. Thus, we have an early picture 
of Cyprus, where already international pressures by Western 
powers overruled its Cypriot aspirations for independence. It 
became a necessity to the West that Cyprus remain under the 
Western sphere of protection and domination. 
Once the British had reconstructed Cypriot realities and 
dual nationalities had developed, the rise of“nationalism in '■ 
the island can be observed. The Greek Cypriot majority is the 
first to demonstrate its opposition to colonial rule, the Tur- 
kish minority always being a few steps behing ini this develop- 
ment. Greece’s long process of nation-building through union 
of its ancient territories with the mainland, had left Cyprus 
out in the cold, because of international opposition. Conse- 
quently, Greece welcomed Greek Cypriot actions with open arms. 
To combat such a majority, the British invented and introduced 
a third party into the dispute, mainland Turkey. This deliberate 
action marked the first confrontation between two communities 
that had for centuries lived peacefully side-by-side. Stirring 
up the Turks to become ant"interested party was a necessity to 
the British since Cyprus was becoming indispensable for its 
strategic position in the South-Eastern Mediterranean, especial- 










ame a staging-post for operations in the Middle East. The 
tish united with the minority of Cyprus to outnumber 
island’s majority and justify their presence there. More- 
r, Turkey was emerging as a precious western ally, protecting 
tish oil-interests in the Persian Gulf and preventing 
sian penetration into the area. This latter factor was to 
adopted by NATO and to become the official policy of the 
iance with regards to Turkey. 
This manufactured triangular situation created bitter 
hatred among the Greek Cypriot majority. It made them feel 
like a powerless minority, whereas the- real minority -the Tur- 
kish Cypriot- was dominant. It also reflects the classic 
technique of successive British governments : to play one group 
off against the other and become a.sort of a ’’mediator” to re- 
concile the differences between the two ethnic communities 
which, they themselves, had created! This then justified their 
continual presence on the island. (Kitromilides, 1977). 
British discrimination against Greek nationalism stregth- 
ened Turkish nationalism on the island. Britain went so far 
as to ban activities of the Greek extremist group EOKA, but to 
allow activities of its Turkish equivalent the extremist group 
Volkan, whose appearance has already been mentioned in Chapter 
One. Furthermore, employing Turkish Cypriots in the police 
force to combat the majority meant that in a country where 
martial law was in effect, its restrictions and prohibitions 
were in essence directed against one and only one target, the 
Greek majority, while the Turkish minority was enjoying the 
privileges and had all the advantages. These actions were 
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divisive, inviting ethnic conflict, long before independence 
in 1960. 
The idea of the partition of Cyprus was another conse- 
quence of British colonial policy, to strengthen Turkish natio- 
nalism. Thus, the approach of independence would trigger con- 
tests over prospective spoils. It was a guarantee to a con- 
tinuous conflict between the two ethnic communities,and an 
attempt to lure Turkey to assume a leading role within NATO. 
Naturally, partition, or "Taksim", became an aspect of Turkish 
policy for Cyprus. It was to counteract Greek aspirations for 
*'enosis". This also reveals that Greece was in an inferior posi- 
tion in NATO, vis-a-vis Turkey. Greece had to compromise with 
a ’’double enosis” solution, which meant maintaining authority 
of a part of Cypriot territory, instead of over none at all. 
The partition idea revived old Turkish claims that 
Cyprus was a Turkish possession. This is partly why it was 
adopted by mainland Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, as official 
policy. Given the geographical setting of the Eastern Mediter- 
ranean, it became clear to the Greek Cypriot majority that they 
remained a tiny majority, when compaired to their Turkish 
neighbour which was only forty miles away across the sea. The 
Turkish Cypriots appeared as a geographically separated section 
of a majority group. The inability of Greece to gain such 
status for herself vis-a-vis Turkey and for her majority, 
started the antagonism between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. 
The appearance of Greece and Turkey in the arena was a develop- 
ment which was beyond the power of the Cypriots to control. 
In fact, the Cypriots who were earlier living in harmony with 
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each other, now found themselves fighting each other. They 
were caught between three foreign powers which claimed interests 
on their soil, 
In a sense, the British had cultivated, through divisive 
policies, the attachments the Cypriots felt to have with their 
respective mother-countries. The British, profiting from this 
"psychological” dependency, managed to bring the two foreign 
countries into the dispute. These countries were British 
allies and both members of NATO. 
In a constitutional agreement which was reached after 
having exerted all sorts of pressures on Greece and Turkey, 
segregation between the two ethnic communities of Cyprus was 
institutionalized. The Constitution was designed in such a way 
as to accomodate and permit ethnic conflict, instead of resolv- 
ing it. It stressed ethnic dualism, instead of meeting the 
practical needs of the entire population. This agreement was 
favourable to the minority and thus revealed the importance 
of Turkey within the Western Alliance, in contrast to that of 
Greece’s unimportance. Furthermore, the Constitution reflected 
the power configuration of Greece and Turkey within NATO. 
Despite the fact that the minority gained a small victory 
by getting favourable conditions, the constitutional agreement 
would in the long run, act against the interests of the Cypriot 
people who were deprived of any power to have a. say in their 
own independence. They were blinded by externally imposed 
nationalism and had to accept an alliance in which external 
forces were uppermost. In this alliance decision-making was 
impossible. 
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The Constitution was a compromise solution between par- 
tition and ’’enosis", policies that the two mother countries of 
Cyprus had dictated to their proteges, under the pressure of 
British colonial diplomacy. In it there were two levels of 
formal political intervention : 
1) The Veto-power of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and 
2) The Treaty of Guarantee which gave Great Britain, Turkey and 
Greece, a formal right of intervention. 
There was no substantial say for the two Cypriot sides who had 
to accept it or face the danger of partition. The seeds of 
partition were institutionalized in'the Constitution and at all 
levels of government, since it was purely bi-communal, aiming 
at separation and inviting foreign intervention, by NATO espe- 
cially . 
From the beginning the Cyprus problem was caught in a 
vicious circle. The Cypriots needed a single political identi- 
ty in order to fight for real independence. However, since 
there w^as no real independence, they were hindered in develop- 
ingt a specific identity they could identify with, which would 
draw them closer together rather than closer to their respective 
mother countries. 
The Cypriot Constitution was designed in such a was as 
to ’’protect" the minority from the majority, as if the two were 
hostile to one another. The government, how^ever, in order to 
function needed the two to be in permanent peaceful agreement. 
There was no power-sharing because there was no power to 
share. Not able to change their own Constitution made each side 
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feel helpless, frustrated and outnumbered in the face of the 
other. This "double-minority" situation made segragation deeper 
and wider, along psychological, social, political and economic 
lines. Even at the hour of independence, the Cypriots were 
treated as objects, rather than subjects in their own country 
as things to be deliberated over, rather than as people to be 
negotiated ■with. 
Additionally, a legacy of inter-communal tension and 
distrust had!been created by outside powers and then built into 
an imposed Constitution. As a consequence of this, the public 
life of Cyprus was aliented by the very spirit of its Constitu- 
tion and always in the direction of ethnic antagonism. 
As Harry Magdoff points out,in many colonies,the dominant 
power has disrupted the traditional ruling groups and destroyed 
their political power. The dissolution of colonies was carried 
out in such a way as to preserve, for the colonial.power, as 
many of its advantages as possible. Therefore, the power 
structure of former colonies is unstable. Such was the case in 
Cyprus (Magdoff, 1966, 1978). 
II. Relations between Greece and Turkey w^ith regards to their 
respective ethnic communities 
As long as economic, cultural, political or military de- 
pendencies do not deprive a society of the ability to determine 
its own course of social development, it is reasonable to define 
it as independent in a political sense. This, was not true for 
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Cyprus, however. The post-1960 period o£ the Cyprus problem 
is characterized by foreign interests -which, contrary to the 
authentic interest and self-determination of a small country, 
are not only permanently profiting from internal tensions, but 
also reproducing them in order to keep doors open for direct 
or indirect foreign intervention. 
Non-alignment as an orientation of the Republic in its 
international relations made Cyprus a target for foreign inter- 
vention and destabilization soon after its independence. The 
deficiencies of the Constitution, that is, the disproportional 
importance given to the minority, the eternal unchangeability 
of its basic provisions and the interventionist claims based on 
its Treaties, was bound to create conflicts among the two com- 
munities. Therefore, it makes a poor argument to attribute the 
conflicts that took place in'the first seven years of Cyprus’s 
independence and which contributed a great deal to an easy 
pretext for NATO intervention, to the Cypriots themselves. 
Although the NATO plan of 1964 which lead to partition or double 
’’enosis!’ did not succeed, it however, promoted political control 
of the Cypriot communities by Athens and Ankara, which meant, 
in essence, control by the heads of NATO in Washington, given 
that Greece and Turkey were dependent on NATO. 
. * 
Analysing the role of Greece and Turkey as intervening 
foreign powers is a complex issue, but it can be safely asserted 
that the dependency each Cypriot community had from its mother- 
country was a serious obstacle to inter-Cypriot mutual under- 
standing. 
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Firstly, there was in effect the political and military 
elites of NATO countries influencing Greek and Turkish policy 
on Cyprus, in the name of the common fear of certain social 
forces, endangering the capitalist economies in their respective 
countries. These pressures were exerted through governmental, 
military and secret service channels. They were especially true 
with the Cypriot non-alignment policy and contacts with the 
socialist and Arab World and, were the point of divergence be- 
tween the Cypriot government and the Greek military government. 
Furthermore, nostalgic national feelings of the two 
neighbour-countries towards the two ethnic communities of Cyprus 
created attachments between these communities with their mother 
countries, instead of between them. These national, social and 
emotional attachments furnished the most effective channels 
through which domestic social and political processes in Cyprus 
could be influenced and directed from outside. 
The institutionalized interference resulted in friction, 
preventing the Cypriots from developing their own political 
consciousness. 
The intervention of Turkey in the affairs of Cyprus has 
a long tradition, as mentioned earlier in this thesis. It con- 
tributed a great deal to tensions between the two communities 
when it sided with the British and was offered the use^ of the 
threat of partition to control the Greek Cypriot struggle. 
Similarily the ^presence of the Greek army in Cyprus act- 
ing on orders from Greek governments attempted several times to 
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overthrow President Makarios and his legal government. However, 
although the Turkish Cypriot community was totally suppressed 
by a dictatorial rule over its community with tight control 
from Ankara, this was not true for the Greek Cypriots. Athens 
faced strong resistance and a policy of independence from the 
Greek Cypriot community. EOKA B, with whose help Makarios was 
overthrown in 1974, was not supported by the Greek Cypriot 
masses. On the contrary, the equivalent Turkish TMT group was 
more successful and dictatorical in its treatment of its people, 
murdering its own nationals when they argued for co-operation 
with the Greek side CAUDINLIK, 28-30/3/79), (Hitchens, 1984). 
The evidence cited in this thesis reveals that the 1964- 
1967, as well as the criminal acts during the invasion of 1974, 
on both sides, were mainly instigated by non-Cypriot elements 
or, Cypriots obeying foreign orders. As mentioned earlier, 
extremist elements on both sides further destroyed the pre- 
existing peaceful Greco-Turkish Cypriot co-existence. Greek of- 
ficers from the mainland were very active in the 1964-1967 
crises, launching attacks against Turkish, mainland soldiers, as 
well as Turkish Cypriot guerrillas, and Turkish Cypriot civi- 
lians. The same people had turned against Greek democrats and 
leftists who were regarded as traitors to the ’’union cause”. 
Similarily, the fanatical Turkish TMT, directed by 
Ankara w^as slowly partitioning the North of Cyprus by establish- 
ing Turkish enclaves, and preparing for a final confrontation 
with the Greek Cypriots. At the same time TMT was assassinating 
Turkish-Cypriot democrats who favoured Greco-Turkish co-opera- 
tion and who publicly voiced their opposition to TMT and its 
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separatist plans (Hitchens, 1984). 
The Turkish government was pursuing a policy of suspicion 
by transmitting its ideology and propaganda to the Turkish 
Cypriot community. The same was not true, however, for Presi- 
dent Makarios and the Greek Cypriot side, which was not a puppet 
of the Greek government. 
The only really serious crisis (mainly caused by inner 
Cypriot tension between 1963-1964) ended in partial separation 
but did not irreparably disturb the island’s inter-communal 
relations. 
One could say that the Turkish Cypriot side was totally 
dominated by Ankara while the Greek Cypriot side was under 
permanent intervention from Athens. 
It has been argued that between 1967-1974 the inter-com- 
munal talks were heading in a direction, where, had it not been 
for external interventions by external powers, a viable Cypriot 
national framework might have emerged. A civilised Cypriot 
nationalism would have been created. However, subversive action 
by Greece and Turkey, by army officers, was taking place on 
Cypriot soil. This was in complete accord with U.S. plans 
for Cyprus, especially after the clash between Athens and Niko- 
sia. The Greek junta, which was increasingly identifying it- 
self with U.S. interests and its communist fears over Cyprus, 
assumed a greater role in these covert and overt operations. 
An analysis limited to the relationship of Greece and 
Turkey to their respective Cypriot communities, definitely 
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indicates that the two foreign powers with traditionally con- 
flicting interests, attempted to expand their hegemony over 
their communities in Cyprus. However, there is a contradiction 
in this relationship. Although at times Greek and Turkish na- 
tional interests have been, and still are in conflict mostly 
over the question of oil rights in the Aegean, both are members 
of NATO and both have been client states of the U.S. The tra- 
ditional foreign policy objective of both Greece and Turkey 
had been to strengthen their own security, in the light of 
the threat posed by a non-aligned Cyprus with a strong communist 
party, by incorporating Cyprus within the Western military 
Alliance. A large proportion of Cyprus controlled by Greece 
would have worked wonders for the junta's prestige, as any pro- 
portion would have suited Turkey's strategic need to control 
access to its southern parts. 
The U.S. would have bases in Cyprus for use in its Middle 
East strategy. The strategy of the Greek junta was to use the 
slogan "enosis" to weaken and, if necessary, overthrow Makarios. 
Time after time, Greece and Turkey had agreed on a "solu- 
tion” to the Cyprus' conflict only to find its implementation 
stopped by Makarios. It was Greece and Turkey who agreed on 
the constitution of 1960 and on the Acheson partition plan in 
1964. It was Greece and Turkey who insisted, in 1971, on a 
Greek and Turkish government representative participating in 
the inter-communal talks between the two Cypriot communities, 
as constitutional experts. And it was in 1971, that Greece and 
Turkey apparently made a secret agreement at a NATO meeting, to 
end the independence of Cyprus and partition the island, without 
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the consent o£ the Cypriots. 
The U.S. has used Greece and Turkey during the past 
decades as vehicles for implementing its objectives consistent- 
ly and totally i-gnoring the aspirations of the Cypriots them- 
selves. It could be said that the Cypriots, suppressed by a 
dominant ideology imposed by military ruling classes (Greek- 
Turkish-NATO) under the rubric of "Enosis/Taksim", were forced 
to fight each other instead of uniting to overthrow the external 
forces that were only pursuing their own strategic and military 
interests. 
III. Relations between the United States, Greece and Turkey, 
over Cyprus 
There are world powers that seek to dominate weaker ' 
states to varying degrees and they dosso'. in order to satisfy 
what are defined by the imperial powers' leaders as the interests 
of their, own citizens CAttalides, 1979). These powers were 
Britain and later the United States, who exercised their 
influence in the course of pursuing their global interests. 
Those strategic interests and their conflicting aim.s inter- 
sected at various times with indigenous political processes and, 
the political processes in Greece and Turkey. 
Another important point is reached here : Since Greece 
and Turkey have been involved in NATO, the Cyprus issue has 
become a Cold War issue. The United States assumed the new role 
of leader and organizer of a world system, replacing Britain, 
unofficially before Cypriot independence, through the formation 
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of NATO. They supported every British action, including the 
seperatist constitutional agreements. 
In the colonial period the United States was concerned 
with the defense of the South-Eastern Mediterranean against a 
’'communist threat" and, with keeping its two NATO allies, Greece 
and Turkey in a peaceful state, for the cohesion of the south 
flank of NATO. The Cyprus conflict was making this harmony 
impossible. On the one hand, Makarios’ policy of non-alignment 
his contacts with the socialist and Arab world and his refusal 
to incorporate Cyprus into NATO, was justified what United 
States policy perceived as a "communist threat". On the same 
grounds, a Greco-Turkish confrontation over Cyprus was always 
a possibility, thus, threatening the Alliance. 
Makarios’s policy was a ;small-state policy which meant 
that in order to survive, it had to place itself between the 
two great powerblocs: and play off East and West in order to 
get a better bargain, politically and economically. 
The 1963-1964 conflict was seen by the United States 
as an opportunity to establish the internal balance of forces 
in Cyprus, in favour of greater Western orientation, and to 
forestall the Cyprus governments appeal to Moscow for military 
aid against the possibility of an invasion by Turkey. Thus 
there was the Johnson mediation to avoid a Greco-Turkish inva- 
sion . 
In order to solve these "problems" and keep the two NATO 
allies satisfied, what was needed was the elimination of the in^ 
dependence of the small state, in such a way as to keep both 
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Greece and Turkey, satisfied. 
The political pressure has more often that not fallen 
on Greece which was a'smaller and a weaker state and, an inferior 
NATO ally in relation to Turkey (Kuniholm, Orbis, Summer 1983) 
CGruen, Orbis, Summer 1980). U.S. diplomacy, being well informed 
of the wishes and fears of the Greek governments exploited 
political situations and manipulated Greece, in order to achieve 
its goals. Thus, they maintained that : 
a) In case of war with Turkey, Greece would be the loser because 
of its smaller army and its inferior military equipment. 
b) The United States claimed they could not always be expected 
to prevent Turkish invasions. 
c) Removing Makarios was in the best interests of Athens, 
Washington and NATO 
d) With an Acheson type solution, the nationalistic dreams of 
Greece could be made possible (Attalides, 1979), (Coufoudakis, 
1977). 
To understand the Greek junta’s policy in Cyprus between 
1971-1974, it has to be understood that its relationship with 
its allies was primarily with the United States and Turkey. 
The junta’s "Turkish policy" was formulated in Athens, with the 
sole aim of falling in line with American efforts to "tidy up" 
the whole Eastern Mediterranean sector in view of the Soviet 
threat and the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The Turkish policy aiming at the partition of Cyprus had 
found a supporter in the Nixon Administration. Turkey had been 
one of the strongest anti-communist countries on the periphery 
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of the Soviet Union and, its military forces were second only 
in number to those of the United States among NATO forces. 
However, after Turkey had been humiliated by President Johnson's 
intervening and preventing the 1964 invasion, she pursued a 
more independent policy and made close contacts with the Soviets. 
This alarmed a U.S. administration that feared the possibility 
of a neutral Turkey. The strategic importance of Turkey was 
much greater compared to that of Greeces' . This legacy is true 
even today (Kuniholm, Orbis, Summer 1983), (Coufoudakis, 1981). 
The military coup organized and believed to be carried 
out by Greek officers, in order to overthrow Makarios, was 
known to the Nixon Administration long before it actually took 
place. The United States government was silently letting 
history take its course and was ignoring Intelligence Reports 
that pointed to a major crisis which'would involve overthrowing 
the Makarios regime as well as provoking a Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus. The Nixon Administration with Henry Kissinger as its 
Secretary of State did not take any action to prevent the in- 
vasion of Cyprus by Turkey. This indicates the replacement of 
democracy by a mini-junta on the island were known, predicted 
and carefully ignored by the United States and executed by 
Greece, a NATO member and a U.S. ally. Its outcome was probably 
a desired one by the U.S. 
However, Makarios survived and escaped and the Turkish 
invasion, claimed as a "peace-operation" followed five' days 
later as planned and was carried out in two stages. The U.S. 
administration was careful not to condemn the coup when it took 
place. It also did not stop the Turkish invasion, contrary to 
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the overwhelming amount o£ evidence by official reports and 
reports of the European Press, between the date of the coup 
and that of the invasion. When in happened it simply pleaded 
ignorance on the matter (Stern, 1977), (Hitchens, 1984). This 
reveals how the partition of Cyprus was falling in line with 
United States interests and was in accord with the original 
Acheson partition plan of 1964, the long standing official U.S. 
policy on the Cyprus issue. It was simply executed by another 
NATO ally, Turkey. 
A series of actions of the U.S. administration that fol- 
lowed after the 1974 invasion, point to the same conclusion. 
Dr. Kissinger promoted a cease-fire agreement on 22nd 
of June by promising Turkey that Glafkos Clerides, a right-wing 
Cypriot leader, would become the President of Cyprus pending 
new elections. The fact that Cyprus already had a constitu- 
tionally elected President, was ignored. 
At a Press Conference that was held over the Cyprus 
crisis. Dr. Kissinger revealed that the U.S. did not, during 
the first and second stage of the Turkish invasion, freeze 
military aid to Turkey and so condemn the Turkish aggression of 
Cyprus. This action was opposed to U.S. legislation. The im- 
portance of this economic, and military aid repre sented the 
United States and Turkey^’ mutual interest in the defense of 
the Eastern Mediterranean (Coufoudakis, 1975). 
Finally, once partition was successfully carried out, an 
arms embargo was imposed on Turkey by the U.S. administration, 
after numerous debates in Congress. This was finally and 
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completely lifted by the Carter administration in 1978, once 
Ankara suspended all U.S. operations and closed down military 
installations in Turkey (Coufoudakis, 1975). Turkey was too 
precious to be lost to the non-aligned world or to the Eastern 
bloc. These facts demonstrate that the U.S. administration 
gave a "carte-blanche" to Turkish policy over the Cyprus issue. 
Furthermore, it gave the Turks priority on the issue. 
After the fall of the Greek junta, the new Greek govern- 
ment resorted to diplomatic methods to seek a solution to the 
crisis. Greece did not really get any "piece of the action” 
from the conflict, and was humiliated abroad, whereas Turkey, 
through its aggressive policy, gained a great deal. After 10 
years of occupation, its 30,000 troops still dominate the 
partitioned north. The temporary sanctions that Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriots received, were only a "front" imposed so as not 
to offend the‘international laws of human rights. The necessa- 
ry steps to create long-range conditions for national survival 
could only be undertaken without presenting a vital danger to 
the very existence of the permanent interventionist forces. 
Even the most serious mistakes, were not rooted in the free will 
and decisions of the Cypriot people. A legacy of "enosis" and 
"taksim" separatism was institutionalized in the Constitution and 
im.posed by the will of external powers. The essence of this 
tragedy and how strong this legacy of intervention hindering 
the development of a common Cypriot identity was, is shown 
when the Cypriot government attempted to act as an independent 
government and was then overwhelmed by a military coup and 
foreign invasion. 
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And yet, there were attempts by the two communities of 
Cyprus to solve their problems. The bi-communal talks which 
lasted six years, raised some hopes for the future of Cyprus. 
This, however, was boycotted, as well, by outside forces. 
The agreement to initiate bi-communal talks was followed the 
day after by an attack from Greek extremists. 
In spite of fears, problems and constant interventions, 
there were improvements in the talks. There were concessions 
by the Turkish side on veto power and reinforced representa- 
tion; and by the Greek side, increasing the components and 
mechanisms for Turkish Cypriot autonomy. The two communities 
had appeared to have reached an agreement in 1973. This was 
not favourably viewed by the western powers. It seems that 
international interests did not view the inter-communal talks as 
a means for a solution for the ethnic conflict between Cypriots. 
They favoured a solution which would come from an agreement be- 
tween Greece and Turkey. The United States wanted a rapid con- 
clusion of the talks and, as mentioned earlier, had warned it 
would not interfere in case of a Greco-Turkish war. This was 
in line with its policy towards the Greek junta and towards 
Turkey and the U.S. strategic and geo-political posture vis a 
vis the Eastern Mediterranean. 
The two ethnic communities of Cyprus did not have a chance 
to develop a clear understanding of their political situation 
and find an adequate ideological expression for their common na- 
tional interests. On the contrary, a legacy of separatism 
institutionalized in the Constitution, haunted its communities 
until the time it became a reality. 
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Thus, an analysis of the external involvements in the 
Cyprus conflict indicated that ethnic conflict was exacerbated 
by external encouragement of extremism. The external linkages 
of Cypriot domestic policies were used effectively for this 
purpose. Therefore : 
1) The use of external forces has been the crucial factor for 
the segregation and political disintegration of Cypriot society. 
2) Internal realities have been exploited by external forces, 
and so^are to a large extent the consequence of external 
factors. The dependent foreign relations of the two mother- 
countries provided a system of linkage through which interna- 
tional power politics in* the Mediterranean could directly in- 
fluence domestic affairs in Cyprus. 
Therefore, the history of Cyprus makes it evident that 
the principal determ.ihing factors for ethnic conflict have not 
been cultural or religious differences, between its two dominant 
ethnic communities, but the policies pursued by interested 
powers, external to Cyprus. The obstacles to the political in- 
tegration of Cyprus have been largely a consequence of the 
functioning of factors outside the boundaries of the state of 
Cyprus. 
Some arguments that Magdoff develops on the "decline of 
Colonialism", will serve as a conclusion to this chapter. 
Magdoff maintains that the decline of colonialism has brought 
problems for the imperialist centres : O For the previous 
owners of colonies Ci.e. Britain), how to maintain their privi- 
leged position, saving as much of the colonial system as 
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possible 2) For the U.S., how to extend its influence and 
control over the privileged preserves of the former colonial 
powers (Magdoff, 1978, p.141). These currents characterize 




It has been argued at the beginning of this study that 
over the last decades, the two ethnic communities of Cyprus, 
which had previously lived peacefully side-by-side, became 
increasingly segregated. 
It has been shown that this division began not in the 
long period of Ottoman rule, but during British Colonial rule. 
During this transformation period, the colonial ruler shaped 
realities on the island along the lines of two differentiated 
nationalities, the Greek and the Turkish. It, thus, set the 
stage for the rise of nationalism and for future ethnic rivalry, 
by favouring one ethnic community over another, for the pur- 
pose of maintaining its imperialist status in Cyprus and in 
the Mediterranean region. 
Social and cultural change, and the whole process of 
modernization, intensified ethnic separation. Along with the 
development of nationalism, these became the factors that con- 
tributed to the rising of ethnic consciousness and conflict. 
Thus, they constituted the internal dynamics of ethnic conflict. 
The process of division of the two communities strengthen- 
ed when Britain allowed Greece and Turkey to gain control over 
Cypriot politics, and the United States to exercise pressures 
there. 
The Constitutional agreements that were reached simply 
institutionalized sectarian differences and legitimized foreign 
involvement‘in Cypriot affairs. Furthermore, they contained 
the seeds of partition which, of British policies of a 
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’’solution” to the Cyprus "question”, was the most desirable for 
Britain. 
The crises that the constitutional compromises provoked, 
proved that the Government of Cyprus was, from the beginning, 
powerless to determine its own future. The limitations of the 
Constitution, which amounts to limitations on its independence, 
and in turn the absence of■the absolute balance of power be- 
tween the two communities, imposed structural barriers to the 
evolution of commonalities and did not inspire confidence in 
the legitimacy of the political regime. 
Constant external interference from the United States, 
Greece and Turkey after independence, dismissed all hopes for 
achieving full independence and eventually power sharing. 
These countries, manipulated all the potential factors in their 
relations with the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, and so 
invited tension. These external involvements have been decisive 
in the distortion of the ethnic relations in Cyprus, and in 
the escalation of conflict, to outright confrontation. 
The United States, as'^ the leader of the Western World 
System, having replaced Britain as the imperial power, along 
with the interested parties were aiming at blocking independence, 
creating ethnic separation, partition of the island and so make 
it subservient to Western interests in the region. This had a 
double function at the time : 
1) To terminate the independence of a small non-aligned state 
with a provokative foreign policy, and turn it as before into a 
base for military operations in the region. 
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2) To give Turkey the lion’s share since its geo-political 
position vis-^-vis the Soviet Union and the Middle East, made 
and still makes it , an anti-communist barrier, and so its de- 
mands were and are to be taken seriously. 
By the 1970’s the island’s population was segregated, 
although not totally, along psychological, social, economic, and 
political lines. 
The events of 1974, the military coup against the Cypriot 
Government, and the Turkish invasion, led to territorial parti- 
tion, a scheme desirable to all interested parties, exceptithe 
Cypriots themselves. 
The prospects are that the two communities will remain 
physically separated, as citizens of a bi-zonal federation, 
rationalized as an inevitable and just consequence of the exi- 
stence of two conflicting ethnic groups. 
what developments we would have in Cyprus, without Bri- 
tish colonial policies, without Greek and Turkish governments’ 
nationalist actions, which further polarized the two communi- 
ties, and, without United States efforts to divide the island, 
it is difficult to say. However, it is certain that religious 
and ethnic differences have not been the determining factors of 
ethnic conflict, between the two ethnic communities of Cyprus. 
It can be argued that without external interventions, 
internal involvements would have been different, once the deter- 
minants would no longer have been foreign powers. The structur- 
ing of the Cypriot reality would not have been contingent on 
Britain, Greece, Turkey and the United States. 
Thus, this perspective challenges the arguments that 
ethnicity produces conflict leading to division. 
The inter-communal conflict in Cyprus xannot be viewed 
alone as a minority/majority issue, but its determinants may be 
found outside the borders of the Republic. International fac- 
tors are the crucial variables accounting for internal develop- 
ments, including ethnic conflict. 
Theoretically, the above analysis suggests that ethnic 
conflict was a'result of a "new", geo-political dependency, and 
possesses nearly all the features of Magdoff’s "new Imperialism". 
Cyprus, an island with a geo-political and strategic position of 
enormous significance in international world politics, in the 
South-Eastern Mediterranean, in near proximity to Middle East 
and Turkey, was colonized by the British, in the last part of 
the 19th century. During the period of Colonial Imperialism, 
the dominant power disrupts the traditional co-existence of 
ethnic groups in order to advance its colonial interests. It 
thus exploits internal realities and promotes ethnic separation, 
and carries out the process of de-colonization in such a way, 
as to preserve as many of the advantages possible, for future 
use, and to prevent social revolutions directed towards real 
independence. 
After independence, Cyprus enters the period of "Imperial- 
ism without colonies". With the break-up of the Imperialist 
system, the United States assumes the role of leader and organizer 
of the world system, and exercises covert domination, interfer- 
ing in the politics of Cyprus, offering a military alliance 
-which is refused- in order to block Cyprus from stepping into 
the socialist camp. 
In a world of competing imperial powers, ancient dif- 
ferences are exploited for modern purposes. The internal dyna- 
mics of conflict are cultivated to prevent real independence 
in Cyprus, and eventually to turn the island into a military 
staging area. The United States associates with reliable govern- 
ments' and establishes ties with the Greek military junta, in order 
to achieve its goal. Although Cyprus appears to be an offi- 
cially independent country, it is actually dominated by this 
covert Imperialism and its linkages, that is Greece and Turkey, 
through their membership in NATO. Ethnic conflict, thus, 
instigated and promoted from the outside, becomes an- inevita- 
bility. The outcome is a partitioned Cyprus. 
As Nehru observed, in overt or, "visible Imperialism”, 
the rulers govern directly, and with responsibility to the po- 
pulation, in order to maintain good relations in the future. 
Similarily in Cyprus, the British introduced a number of measures 
that contributed to the progress of the country, and the well 
being of its population. In contrast, covert Imperialism or 
"invisible Imperialism" can largely dominate and control, with- 
out shouldering any of its responsibility to the population. 
This is easily exercised by supporting military governments by 
choice. In Cyprus, United States diplomacy dominated the poli- 
tical affairs, of the country, through its clients Greece and 
Turkey. Close relations between the United States Government 
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and the Greek military junta, as well as the covert support 
it offered the mini-junta that seized power in Cyprus, 1974, 
have been discussed earlier in this thesis. 
Caught up in international manoeuvres during the Cold 
War, Cyprus acquires a position of dependency, as a result of 
military and strategic priorities. Thus, the strategically 
decisive location of the island, enforces the continued pro- 
duction of the mono-cultural producte: military facilities for 
foreign powers. 
Regionally and in the "geography of political tendencies", 
there are territorial similarities between Cyprus and other 
Middle East countries. As with the Lebanese and the Arab- 
Israeli experiences, the events that took place are symbols of* 
international politics, great power interests and the legacy of 
Western colonialism in the Near East. In a general sense 
Cyprus shares with the Lebanon and the Palestine conflict a 
few common elements. They all involved ethnic conflict, great 
power interests, territorial invasionsi and United States in- 
volvement in the region for NATO operations. However, the 
particular circumstances of the Cypriot experience, and its 
particular form of dependency makes it unique among dependent 
states in general, and dependent states of the Middle East, 
in particular. 
There is a contradiction which has to be pointed out 
here : Cyprus is a European and not a Middle Eastern state, 
with special arrangements with the European Economic Community. 
As a European non-aligned country, it has shared the properties 
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of the Mediterranean non-alignment movement. This movement 
promotes the strengthening of the security and peaceful co- 
operation in the region, particularily with respect to the 
elimination of crisis, pressure, outside interference and, neo- 
colonialist activities. Also, it concerns itself with the re- 
duction of tension and armed forces in the region. 
As a former colony however, which was the only European 
country to be part of a modern empire until as late as 1960, 
it presents itself as a covertly dependent country, in which, 
internal realities were shaped along the lines of external 
interests and resulted in ethnic conflict, and where multi- 
complex NATO intervention has never ceased. In this conflict- 
ing double-identity Cyprus may be in a category of its own, 
vis-a-vis the new dependency. 
Further research of politico-economic dependency with 
relation to multi-ethnic societies might add new theoretical 
dimensions to the field of Political Sociology. An interesting 
topic might be to explore the probability of dependency as the 
decisive factor for the distortion of ethnic relations at a 
multi-cultural society. 
The critical role played by Geo-politics, as in 
course of history especially of Mediterranean history, 
gained new importance in Sociology. The Mediterranean 





and its linl. to geo-politics. Sip.ilarily ',fcture-research could offer 
some useful insights to the complex Cyprus issue. Perhaps new 
researchers of the field will be able to determine whether the 
Cyprus case stands in a category of its own in Political So- 
ciology, or could it actually serve as a model of the geopoli- 
tical dependency being the decisive factor that produces inter- 
ethnic conflict in a society, when the particular domestic 
realities of the small country are effectively exploited. 
In view of this, it can be seen that there are several 
principal dimensions to the unresolved Cyprus crisis. 
As much as in the past as in the present the geo-politic 
al and strategic position of Cyprus has been important in South 
Eastern Mediterranean politics, and several factors are progres 
sively making this importance diminish. 
In the future it is not going to be to the benefit of 
any party involved in the dispute to have an unresolved crisis 
in the Mediterranean. Concerning this, the followingneeds to 
be stressed. 
1) The advanced technology of our era has progressed to such a 
degree as to make the use of satelites possible, subtituting 
thus in the future military facilities and military bases in 
key positions around the globe. In this age of nuclear and 
computerized warfare, conventional strategy and even geo-poli- 
tics are obsolete, while the constant of geography itself can 
no longer be the strategic factor that it was. In the event of 
a Middle Eastern settlement, Cyprus would automatically lose 
the importance it has always had for the West as a base for 
attack^and for the East, as a line of defence CCoufoudakis, 
Orbis, Fall 1981) . 
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2) The failure of the United States Intelligence and diplomacy 
throughout Cyprus’ short period of independence in particular 
during the latest phase of the crisis, has created problems in 
relations between the United States and Greece. The experience 
of the United States’ policy, backing and supporting military 
rule in Greece, and its subversive activities in Cyprus, has 
created a Greek majority that wishes nothing less than the with- 
drawal of all American forces from Greece. 
The circumstances that took place before and after the 
Turkish invasion, concerning United States policy, has caused 
bitterness and a sense of inferiority on the part of Greece 
vis-a-vis Turkey. 
The problem of a divided Cyprus is the major issue in 
Greece’s negotiation about its future role in NATO, and, its re- 
lations with Washington and the European Community. 
Similarily, the same circumstances leading to partition, 
and United States policy over the issue,have created'ideep 
problems in Turco-American relations. It has been the cause 
of alienation on the part of Turkey, ever since the U.S. em- 
bargo on transfers of military equipment to Turkey had been 
imposed. This has marked a precedent for Turkish policy to 
suspend U.S. operations and close-down military installations, 
whenever Turkey wishes to counteract U.S. actions. It often 
makes it explicit to the United States government that access 
to facilities is directly related to decisions on military 
assistance. 
3) The Cyprus crisis has become a stumbling block for Turkey, 
for several reasons : 
a) The permanent stationing of 30,000 men in the North of 
Cyprus and the total support of the new Turkish federated 
state has drained mainland Turkey’s economy. Haunted by a 
series of major problems and in face of the economic, political 
and constitutional collapse, the government of Turkey was over- 
thrown and replaced by General Evren’s military dictatorship. 
b) The Cyprus crisis has been blocking Turkish participation 
in the European Economic Community. The European Convention of 
Human Rights has condemned Turkish actions as violating the 
human rights of the Cypriot people. It has also protested 
against territorial occupation over a large part of Cypriot 
soil, and against the maintainance of Turkish troops in the 
North. European criticism caused the Turks to withdraw from 
the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly in 1982. Full 
membership for Turkey in the E.E.C., a desired goal, is mainly 
hindered by the Cyprus question. 
c) It has led Turkey to strategic isolation. Greece’s re- 
turn to NATO’s southern military wing has contributed to a 
diminishing of the importance of Turkey to the West. This im- 
portance can only be assessed together with Greece’s. 
Similarily the Cyprus conflict has become a stumbling 
block for Greece. 
a) Greece’s foreign policy is pledged to include a-‘”solution 
to the Cyprus problem" as its major task. 
b) The Cyprus conflict has generated a dispute between Greece 
and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean. Greece’s sea 
and air space have been violated frequently by Turkey, which 
often resorts to a show of strength. 
c) Greece has attained a position of inferiority vis-a-vis Tur- 
key in NATO. The Greek Government has publicly claimed since 
1981 that it regards Turkey as its rival neighbour, with the 
biggest NATO army in Europe,and not the Soviet Union as a 
threat to the country’s security. Consequently, Greece uses 
the urgency of a solution to the Cyprus crisis as a defensive, 
weapon, for a better bargain vis-a-vis Turkey. 
Greco-Turkish relations have been badly harmed and two 
NATO allies which are supposed to have mutual defense arrange- 
ments are in a constant state of the threat of war, and the 
threat of the dissolution of NATO. 
4) The Cyprus crisis has created most damage to the Cypriots 
themselves. 
The Turkish Cypriot leadership, despite the fact that it 
was left with all the advantages, was not successful in keeping 
the economy of the occupied North going, and the Turkish 
Federated State cannot exist on its own. It is suffering from 
high inflation and an economic blockade imposed by the official 
Cypriot government and the international community. Further- 
more, the new Turkish state has been recognized only by two 
conservative Moslem states : Turkey and Bangladesh. Third 
World countries especially supported U.N. resolutions that are 
in favour of a unified and independent Cyprus. 
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Comparing Turkish Cyprus’ economically underdeveloped 
situation with the rising prosperity of the Greek South, makes 
its problem seem even larger. 
In comparison, the Greek Cypriots having suffered the 
losses brought about by a foreign invasion and division of 
their country into two, have recovered from an economic disa- 
ster, and claim to have learned from the mistakes of the past. 
The basis of co-operation has always existed in Cyprus 
and the two ethnic communities, if left alone, could reach 
some degree of trust and a political consciousness of their 
distinct national identity. 
If the two communities of Cyprus are able in the future 
to keep out of foreign domination and reach a settlement there 
is hope for the future. Characteristic, is the continuous 
involvement of the mother-countries in the negotiations for a 
settlement, contained in a statement that the ex-Turkish 
Foreign Secretary Gunes made to James Callaghan at a Geneva 
Conference in 1974 : ”It is not the Cypriots who decide the 
fate of Cyprus, it’s the Turks and the Greeks and all the rest 
is blah-blah" (Irish Times, 3-4-1976). 
The government of Cyprus has the task to promote the 
initiative to improve and spread a new consciousness. 
In the area of education the common political conscious- 
ness has to be raised. Here the situation ‘does not seem to bright 
for it seems that since 1974 very few changes have taken place. 
in terms o£ the dogmas and the ideology prevailing in each 
sector of the divided state. Kadritzke and Wagner mention an 
astonishing incident that reveals the attachments that still 
exist between each community with its mother-country. The Greek 
Cypriots in the Olympic Games at Montreal were part of the Greek 
team, under a Greek flag, instead of having formed together a 
team, representing the Republic of Cyprus (Kadritzke & Wagner, 
1979). 
For an oppressed people, its ability to determine its 
future, is also dependent on the ability to reanalyse its own 
history frankly, and learn from its mistakes. 
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